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ABSTRACT 
Over the next decade an increasing number of new “pharmacotherapy” 
medications will become available with the potential to tremendously impact the use 
and abuse of illegal drugs and the overall direction of national and international drug 
policy.  These pharmacotherapy medications are designed to block or significantly 
reduce the “highs” elicited by illegal drugs.  Used as part of a drug treatment 
program, pharmacotherapy medications may provide valuable assistance for people 
voluntarily seeking a chemical aid in limiting or eliminating problem drug use.  
However, the tremendously politicized nature of the “drug war” raises substantial 
concerns that, in addition to those who voluntarily choose to use such medications, 
some people will be compelled to use them.  This article concludes that in the 
absence of extraordinary circumstances, governmental action forcing or coercing a 
person to use a pharmacotherapy drug would violate a number of important legal 
rights.  Among the rights implicated by compulsory use of pharmacotherapy drugs 
are the right to informed consent, the right to bodily integrity and privacy, the 
protection against cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to freedom of thought. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With funding and other encouragement provided by the United States Federal 
Government, pharmaceutical companies are developing a new breed of drugs 
specifically intended to diminish or entirely block the effects of illegal drugs.  The 
aim of these new “pharmacotherapy” drugs is to inhibit at the biochemical level the 
very ability of a person to experience the psychotropic effects of certain illegal 
drugs.  Section II examines various factors that raise a reasonable concern that these 
pharmaceuticals will migrate from voluntary use to compulsory use within certain 
population segments.  Section III of this article begins with an overview of these new 
drugs: how they work, who is designing and marketing them, and how they may 
benefit those seeking a chemical aid in limiting problem drug use.  Section IV 
identifies and discusses a number of constitutional and other legal issues that will 
arise should use of these drugs be mandated for some people.  
II.  FROM DEMAND REDUCTION TO DESIRE REDUCTION 
The United States is currently leading the world in an all out “war on drugs.”  
The modern version of this war was declared on June 17, 1971, when former United 
States President Richard Nixon called on Congress to approve the Special Action 
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Office of Drug Abuse Prevention that would consolidate Federal resources against 
“America’s public enemy number one.”  Nixon declared that, “[I]n order to fight and 
defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive.”2  The ambitious 
goal of the drug war is to eradicate all use of illegal drugs, giving rise to “Drug-Free 
Workplaces,”3 “Drug-Free Borders,”4 “Drug-Free Families,”5 “Drug-Free 
Communities,”6 and ultimately a “Drug-Free America.”7 
On June 17, 1971, President Nixon requested a $155,655,000 budget to wage the 
war on drugs for the 1972 fiscal year.8  Thirty-three years later, the federal budget 
requested for the war on drugs reached $12.6 billion dollars for the 2005 fiscal year.9  
Despite the federal government’s dedication to its task and heavy-handed threats of 
imprisonment, fines, property forfeiture, loss of employment, and even removal of 
one’s children, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
(SAMHSA) estimates that 19.5 million Americans (age twelve or older) defy the law 
each month by using an illegal drug.10 
Even with widespread violation of the drug prohibition laws and amidst rising 
national and international recognition of the folly of fighting a “war” on drugs, the 
United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has vowed not to “punt on 
the third down.”11  Alongside efforts to reduce the supply and demand of illegal 
drugs, the federal government has begun pursuing a new tactic, one that expands the 
drug war battlefield from the Colombian coca farms and the Middle Eastern poppy 
fields to a new terrain directly inside the bodies and brains of drug users.  
In this new extension of the drug war termed “pharmacotherapy,” the federal 
government is partnering with large and small pharmaceutical companies to develop 
                                                                
2President Richard Nixon, Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control, (June 17, 1971), in 3 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States: Richard Nixon 202 (1971), available at http://www.nixonfoundation.org/Research_ 
Center/PublicPapers.cfm?BookSelected=1971#P584_18482. 
3Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-07 (2005). 
4Drug-Free Borders Act of 2001, S. 92, 107th Cong. (2001) (introduced by Senator Phil 
Gramm). 
5Drug-Free Families Act of 2001, S. 89, 107th Cong. §131 (2001). 
621 U.S.C. § 1521 (2005). 
7Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1998). 
8Peter B. Goldberg & James V. DeLong, Federal Expenditures on Drug-Abuse Control, in 
DEALING WITH DRUG ABUSE: A REPORT TO THE FORD FOUNDATION (1972), http://www. 
druglibrary.org/schaffer/library/studies/dwda/staff5.htm (last visited June 20, 2005).  
9Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, Summary: FY 2005 National Drug Control Budget 
(Feb. 2004), available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/budgets 
um04/budget_highlights.pdf. 
10Substance Abuse & Mental Health Services Admin.: Office of Applied Studies, Results 
from the 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: National Findings, DHHS Publ’n 
No. SMA 03–3836, NSDUH Series H-22 (2003). 
11Let’s Don’t Punt on the Third Down (Commonwealth Club of California radio 
broadcast, February 12, 2002) (DEA Administrator Asa Hutchinson commenting), transcript 
available at http://www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/02/02-02hutchinson-speech.html. 
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a new breed of pharmaceutical drugs designed to padlock the brains of drug users so 
that even if a person ingests an illegal drug, the drug will be intercepted within the 
blood stream or otherwise blocked from entering the brain.  The American 
Government’s hope is that demand for illegal drugs can be reduced, in part, by 
chemically eliminating the very desire to use an illegal drug.  
III.  PHARMACOTHERAPY DRUGS 
The pharmacotherapy drugs that are the subject of this paper fall into one of three 
general classes: brain receptor blockers; molecule binders; or metabolism modifiers. 
The first class of drugs works by entering specific drug receptor sites on the 
surfaces of brain cells or neurons, thereby blocking illegal drug molecules from 
plugging into those receptor sites.  Of these blockers, there are three basic types: 
agonists, partial agonists, and antagonists.  Agonists are compounds that bind to 
receptors and produce significant physiological activity.12  Partial agonists are 
compounds that bind to receptors, but cause a relatively small amount of activation.13  
Antagonists are compounds that enter receptor sites, but do not produce any 
physiological activity; they simply block the receptors.14  All of these compounds 
work by occupying receptor sites on the surfaces of neurons, thereby preventing 
molecules of the illegal drug from docking and producing their psychotropic effects. 
In addition to receptor blocking compounds that act upon the neurotransmitter 
system, the second class of pharmacotherapy drugs works within the bloodstream, 
binding to an illegal drug molecule and thereby making it too large to pass through 
the blood-brain barrier.15  Because the illegal molecule is then unable to make it into 
the brain, it is prevented from producing any psychotropic effects.  
The final class of pharmacotherapy drugs alters the metabolism of certain target 
drugs, thereby causing a build up of toxic metabolic products that make a person feel 
extremely ill.16  The best known of these metabolism-modifiers is Antabuse® 
(disulfiram), a drug primarily used to discourage people from drinking alcohol. 
A.  Target: Opiates 
Some pharmacotherapy drugs that block or reduce the effects of psychotropic 
drugs are already available.  The best known is an agonist named methadone, which 
was initially developed as a long-acting analgesic.  Methadone has been used for 
over thirty years as a government-sanctioned substitute for heroin and other illegal 
opiates.  Methadone occupies the same opioid receptor site as heroin, but whereas 
heroin produces a significant feeling of euphoria, methadone, when used orally as 
prescribed, reportedly produces little euphoria.  A methadone user who takes a 
typical street dose of heroin will feel practically no effect from the heroin because 
the methadone will have already entered the brain’s opioid receptor sites thus 
blocking the heroin from entering.  Additionally, by occupying opioid receptor sites, 
                                                                
12STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 37 (27th Ed. 2000). 
13Id. 
14Id., “antagonist.” 
15See for example, discussion of “TA-CD,” infra, pp. 221. 
16See, infra pp. 225. 
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methadone substantially reduces the unpleasant effects associated with heroin 
withdrawal. 
Another drug currently used to treat heroin addiction is naltrexone.  This drug 
was created by DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Corporation and has been available 
for use since the 1980s.  Unlike methadone, which produces mild pleasurable effects, 
naltrexone is an antagonist that blocks the brain’s receptors for heroin and other 
opiates and does not produce any pleasurable effects.  When initially marketed as a 
treatment for heroin and other opiate addiction, it was named Trexan®.  In 1994, the 
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) also approved the use of 
naltrexone for alcohol addicts.  Naltrexone is currently sold under the trade name 
“reVia,” for the treatment of alcohol addiction.17 
DuPont has encountered several hurdles in marketing naltrexone to heroin and 
alcohol addicts.  Presently, naltrexone is used by less than one percent of self-
reported opiate addicts.18  There are a number of reasons why naltrexone has not 
been a popular medicine.  The brain’s receptors cannot be labeled as “good” or 
“bad,” or as “government approved” versus “unapproved.”  The opioid receptors 
play multiple roles, from pain reduction to euphoria production.  Naltrexone fills the 
brain's opioid receptors indiscriminately, which means it cannot tell an illegal opiate 
(like heroin) from a legal opiate painkiller such as Vicodin® (hydrocodone).  As a 
result, a person taking naltrexone is placed in the precarious position of not being 
amenable to conventional opiate-based painkillers.  For this reason, people taking 
naltrexone are advised to carry a card with them at all times, advising emergency 
medical personnel that the most common medications used to treat serious pain will 
have little or no effect on them.19   Second, naltrexone cannot be given until after a 
                                                                
17See Barr Pharmaceutical’s Product Guide, available at http://www.barrlabs.com/product 
guide.php (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). 
18Clifford Goodman et al., Market Barriers to the Development of Pharmacotherapies for 
the Treatment of Cocaine Abuse and Addiction: Final Report (The Lewin Group, 1997), 
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/cocaine/final.htm (last visited June 20, 2005). 
19The “Naltrexone Safety Identification Card” that DuPont provides reVia users states: 
TO MEDICAL PERSONNEL TREATING ME IN AN EMERGENCY: This patient 
is taking the oral opioid antagonist reVia®, formerly known as Trexan® (naltrexone 
hydrochloride).  
In an emergency situation with patients receiving fully blocking doses of reVia®, a 
suggested plan of management is regional anesthesia, conscious sedation with a 
benzodiapine, use of non-opioid analgesics, or general anesthesia.  In a situation 
requiring opioid analgesia, the amount of opioid required may be greater than usual 
and the resulting respiratory depression may be deeper and more prolonged.  A rapidly 
acting opioid analgesic that minimizes the duration of respiratory depression is 
preferred.  The amount of analgesia administered should be titrated to the needs of the 
patient.  Non-receptor mediated actions may occur and should be expected (e.g., facial 
swelling, itching, generalized erythemia, or bronchoconstriction), presumably due to 
histamine release.  Irrespective of the drug chosen to reverse reVia® (naltrexone 
hydrochloride) blockade, the patient should be monitored closely by appropriately 
trained personnel in a setting equipped and staffed for cardiopulmonary resuscitation.   
For medical emergencies, call your regional Poison Control Center.  Further 
information may be obtained by calling: 1-800-4PHARMA.  
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patient is fully detoxified from opiates.  If an active opiate user takes naltrexone, it 
will precipitate sudden and violent withdrawal.20  
Another problem for the marketers of naltrexone was recently uncovered by 
researchers testing the drug on marijuana smokers.  To the researchers’ surprise, 
people who were given naltrexone and then smoked marijuana reported that they felt 
greater psychotropic effects from the marijuana than if they had simply smoked 
marijuana alone.21  In other words, while naltrexone blocks the psychotropic effects 
of alcohol, heroin, and opium, it appears to increase the effects of marijuana.  
In October 2002, the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approved two new medications for treating opiate addiction, both developed by 
Reckitt Benckiser Pharmaceuticals.  The new drugs, Subutex® (buprenorphine 
hydrochloride) and Suboxone® tablets (buprenorphine hydrochloride and naloxone 
hydrochloride), contain buprenorphine, a partial opioid agonist.22  Like methadone, 
buprenorphine binds to the brain’s opioid receptors, but produces significantly 
reduced pleasurable effects than heroin.  
Subutex and Suboxone are unique not so much for their chemical makeup or 
mode of operation, but for the regulatory hurdles they overcame.  Unlike other 
pharmacotherapies for heroin addiction (e.g., methadone, naltrexone, ORLAAM23), 
which can only be dispensed by specialized “Opioid Treatment Clinics,” specially-
trained doctors are permitted to prescribe Subutex and Suboxone drugs in a standard 
office setting under the Drug Addiction Treatment Act (DATA) of 2000.24 
                                                                
20V.W. Tornabene, Narcotic Withdrawal Syndrome Caused by Naltrexone, in 81:6 
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 785-7 (1974). 
21M. Haney, A. Bisaga, & R.W. Foltin, Interaction Between Naltrexone and Oral THC in 
Heavy Marijuana Smokers, in 166(1) PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY (BERL.) 77-85 (2003), abstract 
available at http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00213/contents/02/01279/s00213-002-
1279-8ch002.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). 
22See product website at http://www.suboxone.com/patients/suboxone (last visited Nov. 
19, 2006). 
23ORLAAM® (Levomethadyl hydrochloride acetate) is a synthetic opioid agonist that was 
approved by the FDA for the management of opiate dependence in 1995.  After receiving 
increasing number of reports of severe heart problems associated with use of ORLAAM, it 
was removed from the European market in 2001.  In August 2003, Roxane Laboratories, the 
manufacturers of ORLAAM, announced that it would be discontinuing the sale and 
distribution of ORLAAM “after the current inventory is depleted.”  See letter from Michael 
Schobelock, Assoc. Director, Medical Affairs Dep’t, Roxane Laboratories, to Healthcare 
Professional [Community] (August 23, 2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/ 
shortages/orlaam.htm. 
24United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA): Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research, Subutex (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride) Suboxone Tablets (Buprenorphine 
Hydrochloride and Naloxone Hydrochloride), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/info 
page/subutex_suboxone/default.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).   
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B.  Target: Cocaine 
With an estimated two million people in the United States using cocaine at least 
once a month,25 a number of pharmaceutical companies are working to develop drugs 
that will block the effects of cocaine.  The National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) 
has allocated $12 million to a five-year test of a “cocaine vaccine” currently known 
only as “TA-CD.”26  The drug is being developed by Xenova, a pharmaceutical 
company, and works inside the body by attaching itself to cocaine molecules and 
rendering them too large to pass through the blood-brain barrier.  
In an early test, TA-CD was injected into mice, which were then fed cocaine.  
According to the researchers, none of the cocaine entered the brains of the mice.  
With periodic boosters, the “vaccine” reportedly remained effective for more than a 
year.27 
In 1999, TA-CD was tested on human subjects.  Volunteers were injected with 
the “cocaine vaccine” once a week for four weeks and, according to researchers, 
“antibody responses” lasted almost three months without any adverse affects.  In 
October of 2003, Xenova began testing TA-CD in a randomized, placebo-controlled 
clinical trial involving 132 human subjects.28 
Another anti-cocaine drug is under development by DrugAbuse Sciences, Inc., a 
California company whose business plan is built solely upon developing 
pharmacotherapy drugs.  DrugAbuse Sciences is racing to develop “DAS-431,” a 
“cocaine vaccine” that the company aims to release in both an injectable form as 
well as an inhalable aerosol.29 
                                                                
25Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), Office of 
Applied Studies, 2003 National Survey on Drug Use & Health: Detailed Tables, Table 1.21A, 
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda/2k3tabs/Sect1peTabs1to66.htm#tab1.21a (last visited Nov. 
19, 2006). 
26The term “vaccine” is used by Xenova to describe TA-CD.  The company’s website 
description of TA-CD states: “Xenova is developing a therapeutic vaccine, TA-CD, for the 
treatment of cocaine dependence, for which there is no currently available effective treatment. 
. . . TA-CD is designed to induce cocaine-specific antibodies which bind to cocaine in the 
blood, blocking its uptake into the brain. Therefore, the human physiological response to 
cocaine is altered, reducing the reinforcing properties of cocaine and permitting patients to 
break the cycle of addiction and abuse.  The active ingredient of the TA-CD vaccine is a 
protein conjugate: a cocaine derivative coupled to recombinant cholera toxin B (rCTB). The 
finished TA-CD vaccine consists of the protein conjugate adsorbed onto aluminum hydroxide 
gel adjuvant in saline. The vaccine is administered by intramuscular injection and it is 
anticipated that a short course of injections will be required to induce antibody responses.”  
Xenova Group plc, TA-CD: Background, http://www.xenova.co.uk/dc_ta_cd.html (last visited 
June 14, 2005).  
27Patrick Zickler, Blood-borne Medications Could Intercept Drugs Before They Reach the 
Brain, in 14 NIDA NOTES 2 (1999), http://165.112.78.61/NIDA_Notes/NNVol14N2 
/medications.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). 
28Xenova Group plc, supra note 26. 
29DrugAbuse Sciences, New Products in Development, available at http://www.drug 
abusesciences.com/products.asp (last visited June 20, 2005). 
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C.  Target: Marijuana 
A number of pharmaceutical companies are working to develop drugs that will 
block the marijuana “high” sought by the world’s estimated 162 million regular 
marijuana users.30  In 1988, researchers identified the receptors in the brain to which 
the marijuana molecule attaches.  Named “Cannabinoid Receptor 1” (CB1), it 
became the site of intensive scientific research, subsequently leading to the discovery 
that the brain naturally produces several compounds that fit the CB1 receptors.  One 
of these natural compounds was named “anandamide” from “ananda,” the Sanskrit 
word for “bliss.”  
CB1 receptors are “extraordinarily abundant in the brain.”31  They are particularly 
ubiquitous in the basal ganglia and the cerebellum, which regulate and coordinate 
body movements.  CB1 receptors are also abundant in the hippocampus, which plays 
a central role in learning and memory, and in the cerebral cortex, which is involved 
in integrating higher cognitive functions.  To a lesser extent CB1 receptors can also 
be found in the heart, lung, prostate, uterus, ovary, testis, bone marrow, thymus, 
tonsils, and adrenal gland.32 
Working with a grant from the National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA), 
scientists have created an anti-marijuana drug that occupies the brain’s CB1 
receptors, thereby blocking marijuana from entering its host receptors.33  Created by 
the French pharmaceutical firm Sanofi-Synthelabo, and named “SR141716,” the 
drug may become the ultimate “buzzkill.”34 
In a test conducted in 2002, sixty-three adult males who smoked marijuana after 
taking ninety milligrams of SR 141716 reported significant reductions in how “high” 
or “stoned” they felt.  Even though blood tests showed that THC 
(tetrahydrocannabinol, the primary psychoactive principle in marijuana) was 
coursing through their veins, SR141716 was blockading the brain receptors that THC 
normally plugs into.35  The subjects reported that SR141716 reduced their marijuana 
high by as much as 75 percent.  
                                                                
30Trends: Consumption – Cannabis, GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS 2003 (UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime: UN Int’l Drug Control Program Research Section, Vienna, Aus.), at 136, 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/trends2003_www_E.pdf (last visited June 14, 2005).  
31Institute of Medicine: Division of Neuroscience and Behavioral Health, Chapter 2: 
Cannabinoids and Animal Physiology, in MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE 
BASE 1.1, 2.9 (Janet E. Joy et al. eds., 1999), http://www.rism.org/isg/dlp/ganja/analyses/ 
Marijuana%20and%20Medicine%202a.html (last visited June 16, 2005). 
32Id. at 2.38.   
33Press Release, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Potential Medication Can Reduce 
Effects of Smoke Marijuana in Humans (April 12, 2001), at http://www.drugabuse.gov/ 
MedAdv/01/NR4-12.html. 
34Patrick Zickler, NIDA NOTES Staff Writer, Cannabinoid Antagonist Reduces 
Marijuana’s Effects in Humans Research Findings, in 17(3) NIDA Notes (Oct. 2002), 
available at http://www.nida.nih.gov/NIDA_Notes/NNVol17N3/Cannabinoid.html. 
35Marilyn A. Huestis et al., Blockade of Effects of Smoked Marijuana by the CB1-Selective 
Cannabinoid Receptor Antagonist SR141716, in 58(4) JOURNAL ARCHIVES OF GENERAL 
PSYCHIATRY, at 322-328 (April 2001), abstract available at http://archpsyc.ama-
assn.org/cgi/content/abstract/58/4/322.  
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Sanofi-Synthelabo believes a different formulation of the compound may also be 
effective in blocking the effects of cocaine.36  Sanofi-Synthelabo is set to begin 
Phase II clinical trials aimed at determining whether SR141716 might also reduce 
the effects and desire for alcohol.37  Under the tradenames “Acomplia” and 
“Rimonabant,” the company is working to release the drug as an obesity and anti-
smoking treatment.38 
D.  Targeting Legal Drugs 
1.  Target: Nicotine 
At last count, approximately 70.8 million people in the United States regularly 
use some type of tobacco product.39  The effects of nicotine on the brain are 
complex, but it is well established that the drug stimulates the production of 
dopamine, a neurotransmitter that produces feelings of pleasure and euphoria.  
Cigarette smokers enjoy the pleasurable effects of this legal dopamine surge.  An 
increasing number of nicotine users, however, are becoming concerned about the 
associated health problems; each year two out of three cigarette smokers decide to 
try to quit smoking.  
For many, quitting smoking does not mean quitting nicotine.  The leading 
products in the smoking cessation market are Nicotine Replacement Therapy (NRT) 
products, which are available in four different forms: gum, patch, inhaler, and 
microtab.40  Products such as Nicorette® gum and the NicoDerm CQ® patch  work 
by releasing nicotine into the body in a way that is reportedly less harmful than 
smoking tobacco. Nicorette’s market dominance is, in part, due to the fact that 
although it began as a prescription medication in 1984, the FDA approved it (and 
NicoDerm CQ) for over-the-counter sales in 1996.  As a result, sales of both 
products soared.41  
                                                                
36Robert Mathias, Study Opens Promising New Approach to Developing Medications To 
Prevent Relapse to Cocaine Use, in 17(3) NIDA NOTES (Oct. 2002), http://www.drugabuse. 
gov/NIDA_notes/NNVol17N3/Promising.html.   
37See National Institutes of Health, United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, Protocol No. 04-AA-0072, Clinical Trial of the Cannabinoid CB1 Receptor 
Antagonist, SR141716 (Rimonabant), to Reduce Voluntary Ethanol Drinking in Healthy, Non-
Treatment Seeking Individuals Who Consume Between 20 and 50 Drinks Per Week (National 
Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism sponsoring the study), available at http:// 
clinicalstudies. info.nih.gov/detail/A_2004-AA-0072.html (last visited June 14, 2005).   
38Gina Kolata, Will a New Drug Melt the Pounds? It May, but Doctors Urge Caution, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, § 1, at 1.   
39National Institute on Drug Abuse, NIDA InfoFacts: Cigarettes and Other Nicotine 
Products, at http://www.drugabuse.gov/infofacts/tobacco.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).  
40GlaxoSmithKline has a website devoted to the Nicorette family of products.  See 
GlaxoSmithKline, http://www.nicorette.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). 
41According to a 1997 report prepared by United States Department of Health and Human 
Services, Office of Health Policy, “Saels in the second quarter of 1996 increased over 100% 
from the sales in the first quarter, rising from $37 million to $78 million.  During 1996 alone, 
the sales from Nicorette supassed $225 million dollars.  This figure is comparable to target 
peak annual revenues for new drugs of major pharmaceutical companies.”  “Case Study: 
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Today, over one-third of Nicorette users report that while they are no longer 
addicted to cigarettes; they are now addicted to Nicorette.42  One such Nicorette user 
told The New York Times that after giving up cigarettes with the aid of Nicorette, she 
then found it exceptionally difficult to quit Nicorette.  “I felt almost like a drug 
addict,” she said, estimating that the twelve pieces of Nicorette she chewed each day 
cost her more than $15,000 over the years, without curing her addiction to nicotine.43  
In May 1997, GlaxoSmithKline (then known as Glaxo Wellcome, Inc.) received 
FDA approval to market a sustained-release version of the antidepressant 
Wellbutrin® (bupropion hydrochloride) to smokers under the name Zyban®.44  
Nabi Biopharmaceuticals in Florida is developing what it terms a nicotine 
“vaccine.”45 Named NicVAX™ (Nicotine Conjugate Vaccine), the drug stimulates 
the human immune system to produce nicotine-specific antibodies that bind to 
nicotine molecules in the blood system, blocking nicotine from reaching the brain.  A 
person who smokes a cigarette after taking NicVAX does not feel any of the 
pleasurable effects normally associated with nicotine; as a result, the person’s 
interest in smoking should diminish. 
When tested in laboratory rats, NicVAX reduced the amount of nicotine reaching 
the brain by sixty-four percent.46  It is currently being tested in humans in the United 
States and the Netherlands.47  
NIDA is taking the “vaccine” moniker literally.  In the agency’s NIDA Notes 
newsletter, the institute reported that NicVAX might be useful not only for those 
people who want to stop smoking, but also as an inoculation for people who have 
never smoked.  According to NIDA Notes, NicVAX “may even prove useful as an 
inoculation against nicotine addiction, much like those that protect children from 
tetanus, measles, and polio.”48  
                                                           
Nicorette,” in Market Barriers to the Development of Pharmacotherapies for the Treatment of 
Cocaine Abuse and Addiction: Final Report, available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/ 
cocaine/final.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). 
42Petra Bartosiewicz, A Quitter’s Dilemma: Hooked on the Cure, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 
2004, § 3, at 8.  
43Id. 
44See letter from Dep’t of Health & Human Services: Food & Drug Admin., to Glaxo 
Wellcome (May 14, 1997) (on file with author), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/nda/ 
97/20711_ZYBAN,%20100MG%20AND%20150MG_APPROV.PDF. 
45See Nabi Biopharmaceuticals, Key Facts about Nicotine Addiction and NicVAX™, 
http://www.nabi.com/pdf/pipe_nicotine_nicvax.pdf (last visited July 22, 2004).   
46Press Release, Nabi Bioharmaceuticals, Nicotine Vaccine Date for Nabia-NicVAX 
Published in Peer Review Journal (Dec. 17, 1999), available at http://yoko001.hp.infoseek.co. 
jp/vaccine/mecha/purpose/merit/media/list/NabiPress.htm. 
47Press Release, Nabi Biopharmaceuticals, Nabi BioPharmaceuticals Initiates NicVAX™ 
Phase II Trial, Investigational Vaccine for the Prevention and Treatment of Nicotine Addiction 
(Aug. 5, 2003), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=100445&p=irol-
newsArticle &ID=438522&highlight=.   
48Barbara Shine, Nicotine Vaccine Moves Toward Clinical Trials, in 15(5) NIDA NOTES 
(Oct. 2000), available at http://165.112.78.61/NIDA_Notes/NNVol15N5/Vaccine.html (last 
visited June 16, 2005).  
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2.  Target: Alcohol 
In the 1940s, workers at a rubber plant became violently ill after drinking 
alcohol.  The cause of the illness was traced to tetraethylthiuram disulfide (aka 
disulfiram), a chemical used in the manufacturing plant.49  The discovery led to a 
new “treatment” for excessive alcohol use.  Marketed under the trade name 
Antabuse® by the Wyeth-Ayerst Company, disulfiram prevents the body from 
properly eliminating alcohol, thereby causing a toxic accumulation of acetaldehyde 
in a drinker’s blood.50  When acetaldehyde builds up in the body, it causes a person 
to feel violently ill.  A person who takes Antabuse and subsequently drinks alcohol 
will, within about fifteen minutes, experience a pounding headache, shortness of 
breath, violent vomiting, blurred vision, chest pain, and dizziness.51  Symptoms 
usually disappear within sixty minutes, but can last for up to four hours.  The 
Physicians Desk Reference lists “death” as a possible reaction when alcohol is 
consumed by a person taking Antabuse, and reports of actual deaths do exist.52  
Because Antabuse causes toxic concentrations of acetaldehyde whenever any 
alcohol is present, the consumption of any alcohol-containing medicines (cough 
syrup, flu medicines, mouthwash, etc.) or alcohol-containing foods can produce 
adverse reactions.53  Even alcohol absorbed through the skin, such as through the use 
of aftershaves, perfumes or shampoos, can trigger negative reactions.54 
E.  Pharmacotherapy Drugs: Good, Bad, Both, or Beyond? 
For people who decide that their use of a psychotropic drug is becoming 
problematic, pharmacotherapy drugs such as Zyban, naltrexone, or SR141716 may 
provide much desired assistance in quitting or reducing drug use.  While some 
people working in the drug treatment field are opposed to “using one drug to treat 
another” most people have welcomed the development of these new medicines.  For 
people who find that their use of drugs is causing problems in their lives, future 
pharmacotherapy drugs may provide safe and effective tools for ending or reducing 
excessive or harmful drug use.  The development of these drugs should be 
encouraged and their voluntary use supported. 
Yet, the development of pharmacotherapy drugs – like drug prohibition itself — 
is driven at least as much by politics, power, and profits than by genuine public 
                                                                
49“Antabuse,” THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, (6th ed. 2005), available at http://www. 
bartelby.com/65/an/Antabuse.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). 
50See Odyssey Pharmaceticals, Inc., How Does Antabuse Work? http://www.antabuse. 
com/productTable.asp?id=16. 
51PHYSICIANS DESK REFERENCE 594 (33rd ed., 1979).   
52Id.  See also R. Fox, Disulfiram-Alcohol Side Effects (Letter to the Editor), 204 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N  271 (1968); see also C.A. Cahill, Safety of Disulfiram, 287(18) NEW ENG. J. 
MED.  935-36 (1972).  
53R.S. Koff et al., Alcohol in Cough Medicines Hazard to Disulfiram User (Letter to the 
Editor), 215 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1988 (1971). 
54See The Carlat Report on Psychiatric Treatment, Antabuse (disulfram) Fact Sheet, 
http://www.thecarlatreport.com/fact_sheets/antabuse.php (last visited June 21, 2005).  
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health concerns.55  If health concerns justified criminal prohibition, then cigarettes 
and alcohol would be illegal.  Use of cigarettes is estimated to kill in excess of 
440,000 people each year in the United States.56  Dr. Alan Leshner, while serving as 
the head of the National Institute of Drug Abuse, said that “[t]he use of tobacco 
products may be the Nation’s most critical public health problem.”57  Likewise, 
excessive alcohol consumption leads to as many as 85,000 deaths each year,58 an 
estimated 27,485 of which are just from alcohol-induced cirrhosis of the liver.59  
Marijuana stands in stark contrast to alcohol and nicotine, in just about every 
respect.  Marijuana is the most commonly used illegal drug in the world, regularly 
used by an estimated 144 million people worldwide.60  According to United States 
Government statistics, 40.4 percent of Americans have tried marijuana during their 
lifetime.61  It is one of the most studied drugs in history, and is regarded by many 
                                                                
55See PHARMACIA CORPORATION, PHARMACIA, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 24, available at 
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/NYS/PHA/reports/ar2001.pdf.  The development of 
pharmacotherapy medications for legal drugs like alcohol and nicotine, is driven primarily by 
profit motives.  In 2001, Pharmacia, acquired by Pfizer in 2003, advised investors that,  
“Nicorette currently controls about half of the worldwide smoking cessation market” with 
sales in 2001 of $299 million.  See also Press Release, Decision Resources, The Market for 
Smoking Cessation Therapies Will More Than Triple Over the Next Ten Years, Predicts 
Decision Resources (June 10, 1998), available at http://www.forces.org/articles/files/ 
pharma.htm (referencing a 1998 study valuing the “smoking cessation market” at $450 million 
and predicting it will reach nearly $1.5 billion by 2007).   
56The Center for Disease Control (CDC): Nat’l Ctr. For Chronic Disease Prevention & 
Health Promotion, Tobacco Information and Prevention Source (TIPS), http://www.cdc.gov/ 
tobacco/issue.htm.   
57NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH REPORT SERIES: NICOTINE ADDICTION, 
Publ’n No. 01-4342 (1998), available at http://www.nida.nih.gov/researchreports/nicotine/ 
nicotine.html (last visited June 20, 2005).   
58Ali H. Mokdad, PhD et al., Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 2000, 291(10) J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 1238, 1241 (Mar. 10, 2004), corrected in 293(3) J. AM. MED. ASS’N 298, 
298 (Jan. 19, 2005).  
59Young-Hee Yoon, PhD et al., Surveillance Report # 63: Liver Cirrhosis Mortality in the 
United States, 1970-2000 1 (2004), available at http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/ 
surveillance63/cirr00.htm (last visited June 20, 2005).  See also Nat’l Institute on Alcohol 
Abuse & Alcoholism, 10th Special Report to the U.S. Congress on Alcohol and Health 24 
ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH 3 (2000), available at http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh24-
1/toc24-1.htm (last visited June 20, 2005) (reporting that alcohol also has deleterious effects 
on other body systems including the brain, the immune system, and the cardiovascular 
system). 
60Trends: Consumption – Cannabis, supra note 30, at 136.  
61 The number of Americans twelve years and older who used marijuana in 2003 
(25,231,000) is greater than the entire population of Texas as of 2000 (20,851,820).  
SAMHSA, OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, RESULTS FROM THE 2003 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG 
USE AND HEALTH: DETAILED TABLES: TABLE 1.1A ILLICIT DRUG USE IN LIFETIME, PAST YEAR, 
AND PAST MONTH AMONG PERSONS AGED 12 OR OLDER: NUMBERS IN THOUSANDS, 2002 AND 
2003 (2003), http://www.drugabusestatistics.samhsa.gov/NHSDA/2k3tabs/Sect1peTabs1to66 
.htm (last visited May 26, 2005); UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU REPORT FOR 2000: 
SUMMARY FILE 4, http://www.census.gov (last visited June 21, 2005).  
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experts as far safer than alcohol.  In 1988, Judge Francis Young, Chief 
Administrative Law Judge for the DEA at the time, presided over an extensive 
hearing on marijuana and concluded: 
In strict medical terms marijuana is far safer than many foods we 
commonly consume.  For example, eating ten raw potatoes can result in a 
toxic response.  By comparison, it is physically impossible to eat enough 
marijuana to induce death.  Marijuana, in its natural form, is one of the 
safest therapeutically active substances known to man.62 
While nicotine and alcohol are legal for adult use,63 a person who smokes 
marijuana - even an adult in the privacy of his or her own home - commits a federal 
crime.64  Even a cancer patient, whose own doctor approves of his or her medical 
use, commits a federal crime by using marijuana.65  
Given that marijuana has been safely used for centuries, while the anti-marijuana 
drug SR141716 has no history of human use, one cannot help but question whether 
“the cure” might be worse than “the illness.”  Given the abundance of CB1 receptors 
in the brain, blocking them indiscriminately with an antagonist like SR141716 may 
produce complex physiological and psychological effects that have yet to be 
understood or even identified.  Further, considering that less than three percent of 
marijuana smokers voluntarily seek treatment,66 it is clear that SR141716 is a drug 
                                                                
62UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, IN THE MATTER OF 
MARIJUANA RESCHEDULING PETITION 58, Docket No. 86-22 (Sept. 6. 1988), available at 
http://www.ukcia. org/pollaw/lawlibrary/young.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). 
63To be clear, I am not suggesting that cigarettes or alcohol should be prohibited.  Alcohol 
prohibition was a failure in all respects, again confirming that drug prohibition produces a net 
harm for individuals and society.  See JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS 
POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (U. Ill. Press, 2d ed. 1986); see also 
MARK THORNTON, ALCOHOL PROHIBITION WAS A FAILURE (Cato Inst. 1991), 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-157.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006). 
6421 U.S.C. § 844 (2000).  
65Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).  Although nine states currently provide legal 
protections for patients who use marijuana for medical purposes, the federal government is 
staunchly opposed to even the medical use of marijuana.  The United States Department of 
Justice even went so far as to threaten physicians with the loss of their prescribing privileges 
for so much as discussing marijuana’s medicinal properties with their patients.  However, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that doctors have a First Amendment right to freely 
discuss any potentially beneficial treatment, including marijuana, with patients.  The United 
States Supreme Court, refused to hear the Justice Department’s appeal of the Ninth Circuit 
ruling, thereby letting the ruling in favor of doctors and patients stand.  Conant v. Walters, 309 
F.3d 629. 9th Cir. (2002), certiorari denied, Walters v. Conant, 540 U.S. 946 (2003). 
66“Marijuana was the second most common illicit drug responsible for treatment 
admissions in 2001, accounting for fifteen percent of TEDS admissions”; however, “[m]ore 
than half (57 percent) of marijuana admissions were referred to treatment through the criminal 
justice system.” SAMHSA, OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, TREATMENT EPISODE DATA SET 
(TEDS), 1992-2001: NATIONAL ADMISSIONS TO SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT SERVICES 
(2003), http://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/teds01/TEDS2K1Chp3.htm#Marijuana (last visited Apr. 
7, 2006).  
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born almost entirely from the fact that the major harm associated with using 
marijuana is political in nature rather than medical. 
Indeed, experts are increasingly pointing out that the policy of criminal drug 
prohibition is responsible for producing medical harm.  Take, for example, heroin 
(diacetylmorphine), the drug commonly characterized as one of the most damaging 
of all illegal drugs.  Heroin was created by the Bayer pharmaceutical company in 
1895 and was available as an over-the-counter pain medication until 1924.  In 1895, 
Bayer began production of diacetylmorphine and coined the name “heroin.”  In 
1898, they introduced it as a commercial substitute for morphine, and it began to 
gain fame for helping morphine addicts with their habit.  In 1924, the Heroin Act 
made manufacture and possession of heroin illegal.  The next year, a thriving black 
market was operating in New York’s Chinatown.67  
Today in the United States, as a result of criminal prohibition, heroin is only 
available on the black market and is commonly adulterated with admixtures that 
increase the health risks, including the likelihood of overdose.68  Additionally, under 
criminal prohibition, most states do not allow heroin users to obtain sterile syringes; 
users are left to re-use syringes and share these with other users.69  One result is that 
needle sharing among injection drug users is now a major force driving the 
HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis C epidemics in America.70  
                                                                
67Heroinaddiction.com, History of Heroin and Opium Timeline, http://www.heroin 
addiction.com/heroin_timeline.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006). 
68Risk of overdose is increased because users have no way of accurately determining the 
appropriate dose of street heroin.  In February 2005, the Canadian Institutes of Health 
Research began a two-year, $8.1 million clinical trial designed to provide pharmaceutical-
grade heroin to 470 habitual heroin users.  The Canadian study follows earlier studies in 
Switzerland and the Netherlands that found that heroin-assisted therapy reduces both the 
individual and social harms associated with chronic heroin use.  See Press Release, Canadian 
Institutes of Health Research, North America’s First Clinical Trial of Prescribed Heroin 
Begins Today (Feb. 9, 2005), http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/26516.html; see also Press Release, 
Canadian Institutes of Health Research, The NAOMI Project: Montreal Components of the 
Canadian Study Using Medically Prescribed Injection Heroin to be Conducted by the CHUM 
(June 6, 2005), available at http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/28330.html. 
69Increasing the availability of sterile syringes through syringe exchange programs, 
pharmacies, and other outlets reduces unsafe injection practices such as needle sharing, 
curtails transmission of HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C, increases safe disposal of used syringes, 
and helps heroin users obtain drug information, treatment, and detoxification.  See Amy 
Smoyer, Needle Exchange “Programs” and Public Policy in Spain (2001), available at 
http://cira.med.yale.edu/about_us/smoyerspain.doc (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).  
70According for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Since the [HIV] 
epidemic began, injection drug use has directly and indirectly accounted for more than one-
third (thirty-six percent) of AIDS cases in the United States.”  Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, “Drug-Associated HIV Transmission Continues in the United States,” 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/ resources/factsheets/idu.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2006). 
Between 1992 and 1995, injection drug users accounted for forty-three percent of all 
reported hepatitis C virus (HCV) infections and that “‘HCV infection is acquired after 
initiation of injection more rapidly than other viral infections, with one study reporting that 
fifty percent to eighty percent of new injectors tested positive for anti-HCV within six to 
twelve months after beginning injection.’”  Miriam J. Alter & Linda A. Moyer, The 
Importance of Preventing Hepatitis C Virus Infection Among Injection Drug Users in the 
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Perhaps most apropos for the topic of this report, a number of studies suggest that 
distributing  naloxone hydrochloride to the friends and family of heroin users could 
save lives by providing people with an immediate way to treat a heroin overdose.71 
Yet, the amount of the federal drug control budget allocated for efforts to supply 
naloxone to heroin users and those closest to them for voluntary use in emergency 
situations is zero.72  Thus, even with respect to heroin, drug prohibition cannot be 
defended as a rational federal policy designed to reduce medical harm.  
What any given society, at any given time, views as unacceptable psychotropic 
drug use is largely a socio-political construct.73  As aptly noted by the British 
Medical Association: 
Almost every psychoactive drug known to humanity, from alcohol to 
opium, has been regarded by some government and society as a dire threat 
to public order and moral standards, and by another government and 
another society as a source of harmless pleasure. Further, nations and 
governments sometimes change their views completely.  Almost every 
society has at least one drug whose use is tolerated, while drugs used in 
other cultures are generally viewed quite differently and with deep 
suspicion.  Mexican Indians may have disapproved of alcohol, but they 
used mescaline.  Most Muslim cultures forbid alcohol, but they tolerate 
cannabis and opium.74 
That being the case, a nation’s drug control policy becomes a tool for social 
control, a tool that can be directed and re-directed at the will of politicians and other 
powerful interests.  This factor, along with several others discussed in the next 
section of this article, suggests that use of pharmacotherapy drugs may not remain 
strictly voluntary for long.  Rather, certain segments of the population could find use 
                                                           
United States, 18 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES & HUM. RETROVIROLOGY S1, 
S6-S10 (1998), abstract at http://www.aegis.com/ news/ads/1998/AD981509.html (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2006).  
71John Strang, et al., Heroin Overdose: The Case for Take-Home Naloxone, 312 BRIT. 
MED. J. 1435-36 (1996), available at, http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/full/312/7044/ 
1435 (last visited Apr. 7, 2006). Shane Darke & Wayne Hall, The Distribution of Naloxone to 
Heroin Users, 92(9) ADDICTION 1195-1199 (1997).  
72A handful of cities and states are instituting naloxone distribution programs despite 
federal government heel dragging.  A new naloxone distribution program in San Francisco is 
underway, based on successful programs that have been operating in New Mexico and 
Chicago.  Others are planned for Baltimore and New York City in the near future.  Press 
Release, Drug Policy Alliance, San Francisco Begins Distributing Naloxone to Heroin Addicts 
(Nov. 21, 2003), available at http://www.lindesmith.org/news/11_21_03naloxone.cfm. 
73Peter Cohen, Drugs as a Social Construct (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Universiteit van Amsterdam), http://www.cedro-uva.org/lib/cohen.drugs.toc.html (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2003); Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, The Crack Attack: Politics and Media in 
America’s Latest Drug Scare, in CRACK IN AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 18, 
20-24 (Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine eds., 1997); Craig Reinarman et al., Scapegoating 
and social control in the construction of a public problem: Empirical and critical findings on 
cocaine and work, in 9 RES. L. DEVIANCE & SOC. CONTROL 37-62 (1988). 
74BMA Professional and Scientific Division, Living with Risk, in THE BRITISH MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION GUIDE (John Wiley & Sons 1987). 
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of these drugs becoming compulsory.  If this is the case, these brain-policing drugs 
present an emerging threat to individual freedom and civil liberties. 
F.  From Drug War to Drug Epidemic 
Compared to other new pharmaceuticals that enter society and primarily face 
marketing challenges, the new pharmacotherapy drugs are unique because of the 
highly politicized environment in which they will be introduced.  As discussed 
above, the development of these drugs cannot be separated from the political 
environment. 
Since its very inception, the United States Government’s drug policy rhetoric and 
enforcement policies have conflated drug use with drug abuse.  Research, however, 
indicates that the vast majority of people who use illegal drugs, (like the vast 
majority of people who use legal drugs) do so without creating problems for 
themselves or others.75  Yet, the drug war paints one broad stroke that casts all illegal 
drug users as abusers.  The fact that a person uses an illegal drug responsibly is not 
taken into account under present federal laws.  Indeed, whether or not the person 
even uses the drug is irrelevant, as the federal law makes it a criminal offense merely 
to possess an illegal drug.76 
Beginning in the 1990s, the United States Government began to re-engineer its 
drug prohibition metaphor, recasting drug users not so much as “the enemy,” but 
rather as victims suffering from the “disease” of drug use who desperately need 
treatment.  In 1997, the disease metaphor was officially consecrated when the 
opening paragraph of that year’s National Drug Control Strategy report compared 
“drug abuse” to an “insidious cancer,” which “diminishes the potential of our 
citizens for full growth and development.”77 
“The metaphor of a war on drugs is misleading,” wrote then-Drug Czar General 
Barry McCaffrey78 in a section of the report titled “An Enduring Challenge:”  
                                                                
75See Thomas Nicholson et al., Is Recreational Drug Use Normal?, 7 J. SUBSTANCE USE 1-
8 (2002), http://duncan-associates.com/Is-Recreational-Drug-Use-Normal.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2006); see also Ethan A. Nadelmann,  Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, 
Consequences, and Alternatives, 245 SCIENCE 939 (1989), http://www.science.smith.edu/ 
departments/Biochem/Chm_357/drug_wars.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2006); see also M.E. 
Jarvik, The Drug Dilemma: Manipulating the Demand, in 250 SCIENCE 387 (1990); see also 
A. Goldstein, & H. Kalant, Drug Policy: Striking the Right Balance, in 249 SCIENCE 1513 
(1990); see also C. Winick, Social Behavior, Public Policy, and Nonharmful Drug Use, in 69 
(3) MILLBANK Q. 437 (1991). 
7621 U.S.C. § 844 (a) (2000) (“It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or 
intentionally to possess a controlled substance . . .”) (emphasis added). 
77Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Strategy: 1997, The 
Purposes and Nature of Strategy, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/htm/chapter1.htm (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2006).  
78Six months after his resignation as “Drug Czar,” Barry McCaffrey joined the board of 
directors of Drug Abuse Sciences, Inc., “the world’s first pharmaceutical company worldwide 
devoted solely to developing medications for the treatment of addiction.” (Press Release. 
(2001, July 24).  Drug Abuse Sciences, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20020212 
064926/drugabusesciences.com/Articles.asp?entry=123 (last visited December 4, 2006).  
DrugAbuse Sciences, views drug abuse and dependence as “chronic disease of the brain.” (Id.)  
Upon announcing McCaffrey as a new board member, Elizabeth M. Greetham, DrugAbuse 
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Wars are expected to end.  Addressing drug abuse is a continuous 
challenge; the moment we believe ourselves to be victorious and free to 
relax our resolve, drug abuse will rise again.  Furthermore, the United 
States does not wage war on its citizens, many of whom are the victims of 
drug abuse.  These individuals must be helped, not defeated.79  
In this same section, General McCaffrey expanded the disease metaphor, writing:  
A more appropriate analogy for the drug problem is cancer.  Dealing with 
cancer is a long-term proposition.  It requires the mobilization of support 
mechanisms — human, medical, educational, and societal, among others 
— to check its spread, deal with its consequences, and improve the 
prognosis.  Resistance to its spread is necessary, but so is patience, 
compassion, and the will to carry on against its inroads. Pain must be 
managed while the root cause is attacked.  The road to recovery is long 
and complex.80 
The National Drug Control Strategy focuses government resources to help 
Americans make the right decisions — for their individual well-being and 
for society — and to reduce the cancer of drugs in America.81 
McCaffrey’s analogy to cancer is calculated.  Cancer is the ultimate modern-day 
illness, the master disease we most fear.  Author Susan Sontag who lived a 
significant portion of her life fighting breast and uterine cancer, pointed out that: 
the use of cancer as a metaphor . . . amounts to saying, first of all, that the 
event or situation is unqualifiedly and unredeemably wicked. It 
enormously ups the ante . . . To describe a phenomenon as a cancer is an 
incitement to violence.  The use of cancer in political discourse 
encourages fatalism and justifies ‘severe’ measures.82   
Although the rhetoric used by McCaffrey suggests an abandonment of the “war” 
metaphor (and with it the strategies, tactics, and fervor drawn upon in “wartime”), it 
is clear that the cancer metaphor is not so much a replacement for the war metaphor 
but rather a new front in that war.  Sontag notes that the: 
controlling metaphors in descriptions of cancer, are, in fact, drawn 
from…the language of warfare. . . . [T]alk of siege and war…has with 
cancer, a striking literalness and authority. Not only is the clinical course 
                                                           
Sciences’ CEO said, “We are extremely fortunate to have General McCaffrey as a board 
member.  He will be of immense assistance to the company in the critical policy and political 
arenas surrounding the treatment of addiction in the U.S. Americans understand that a chronic 
disease like addiction requires effective medical intervention over a long period of time.” (Id.) 
79Id. 
80Id. 
81Id. 
82SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR AND AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 82-83 (1990). 
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of the disease and its medical treatment thus described, but the disease 
itself is conceived as the enemy on which society wages war.83   
Just as our best scientists have been working for decades to find a “cure for 
cancer,” the “cancer of drugs” is now an illness in need of a medical cure.  This line 
of thinking was made explicit in the 2001 National Drug Control Strategy, which 
reported “[j]ust like other chronic diseases such as hypertension, diabetes, and 
cancer, for which medications have been developed, drug addiction is a disease that 
merits medication for its treatment.”84  
Section II of the 2003 National Drug Control Strategy report, titled “Healing 
America’s Drug Users,” opens with a historical anecdote about how London’s 1854 
cholera plague was stopped when Dr. John Snow realized that the infection was 
spreading via contaminated city water.  The report views Dr. Snow’s strategy of 
“block[ing] the vectors that spread contagion,” as a way to “help us fight a modern 
epidemic—the spread of drug use and addiction.”85 
Perhaps of most concern is the fact that the 2003 National Drug Control Strategy 
report drops even the pretense of distinguishing drug abuse from drug use.  In fact, 
the 2003 report expressly targets “drug users” as the primary “vectors of contagion,” 
asserting: 
[Drug use] spreads because the vectors of contagion are not addicts in the 
streets but users who do not yet show the consequences of their drug 
habit.  Last year, some 16 million Americans used an illegal drug on at 
least a monthly basis, while 6.1 million Americans were in need of 
treatment.  The rest, still in the “honeymoon” phase of their drug-using 
careers, are “carriers” who transmit the disease to others who see only the 
surface of the fraud.  Treatment practitioners report that new users in 
particular are prone to encouraging their peers to join them in their new 
behavior.86  
The way a problem is conceptualized or defined often dictates what measures 
will be employed to solve it.87  The fact that the government characterizes illegal 
                                                                
83Id. at 64-66. 
84Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Strategy: 2001, Ch. 
3, § 2, Medications for Drug Addiction, available at http://www.ncjrs.org/ondcppubs/ 
publications/policy/ndcs01/chap3_2.html#9 (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).  
85Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Strategy, Healing 
America’s Drug Users: Getting Treatment Resources Where They Are Needed, Budget 
Highlights, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs03/iiheal_amer_us 
r.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).  
86Id. 
87Thirty years ago, Dr. Andrew Weil noted: 
Until the models that produce the current laws, decisions, and actions about drugs 
change, nothing about drugs will change, hence the uselessness of pressing for legal 
reforms as a means of solving the drug problem.  Counter productive laws against 
possession and sale of drugs are not causes of problems; they are symptoms of 
problems at the level of conceptions, of mental images, just as physical symptoms of 
illness are effects of mental states.   
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drug users as “carriers” and “vectors of contagion,” and that some of the new 
pharmacotherapy drugs have been given the moniker “vaccines,” would dovetail 
with a future move to make the use of pharmacotherapy drugs compulsory, at least 
for some segments of the population.  Already “National Priority 1” of the 2003 
National Drug Control Strategy is titled “Stopping Use Before It Starts: Education 
and Community Action.”88  Although the 2003 report focuses on in-school lessons 
which teach students how illegal drug use is bad for a student’s health, the federal 
government’s focus on students has already gone far beyond “drug education.”  
Today, public school authorities are empowered to conduct random urine testing of 
students who wish to participate in any extracurricular activities, including the chess 
club.89  The new wave of pharmacotherapy drugs promises the ultimate tool for 
“Stopping Use Before It Starts.”  Indeed, the 2002 National Drug Control Strategy 
report coined the new term “compassionate coercion,” noting: 
The overwhelming majority of users characterized with dependence or 
abuse do not see themselves as actually needing drug treatment. This 
tendency is particularly pronounced among adolescents and young adults.  
Of the estimated 3.9 million individuals who needed but did not receive 
treatment in 2000, fewer than 10 percent—just 381,000—reported 
actually thinking that they needed help. . . . But the obvious conclusion 
one would draw from the data is in fact the correct one: most people who 
need drug treatment do not think they have a problem.  To borrow a 
popular phrase, they are in denial.  If there were ever any question about 
the role of coercion in getting people into treatment, these findings should 
answer it. 
Most drug users—the lucky ones, at least—are no strangers to coercion.  
People in need of drug treatment are fortunate if they run up against the 
compassionate coercion of family, friends, employers, the criminal justice 
system, and others.  Such pressure needs no excuse; the health and safety 
of the addicted individual, as well as that of the community, require it.90   
The 2003 National Drug Control Strategy report adds that in addition to 
confrontations by family members and law enforcement officers, drug users may 
well require “the use of innovative techniques for fighting addiction, such as 
specialized pharmaceuticals.”91 
                                                           
ANDREW WEIL, THE NATURAL MIND: A REVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO THE DRUG PROBLEM 1, 
193 (1st ed. 1972).  
88Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Strategy, Stopping 
Using Before It Starts: Education and Community Action, http://www.whitehouse 
drugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs03/istop_use.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).  
89See, Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
90Office of National Drug Control Policy, The 2002 National Drug Control Strategy, 
National Priorities II: Healing America’s Drug Users, available at http://www.whitehousedrug 
policy.gov/publications/policy/03ndcs/2priorities.html (last visited May 7, 2003) (bold 
emphasis added; italics original).   
91“Healing America’s Drug Users: Getting Treatment Resources Where They Are 
Needed,”  In the National Drug Control Strategy: 2003. op.cit.  
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IV.  NEUROCOPS: LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY COMPULSORY PHARMACOTHERAPY 
The compelled use of pharmacotherapy, whether “compassionate” or otherwise, 
would raise a number of legal issues.  Given that the United States Government has 
adopted a policy framed by a metaphor that combines fighting war and illness, and 
which expressly analogizes the use of illegal drugs to cancer, the potential for 
infringing on constitutional guarantees and other legal rights is apparent.  It is well 
known and widely accepted that treating cancer often requires drastic measures that 
knowingly compromise the health of other body systems.  When treating cancer, 
notes Susan Sontag, “[i]t is impossible to avoid damaging or destroying healthy cells 
(indeed, some methods used to treat cancer can cause cancer), but it is thought that 
nearly any damage to the body is justified if it saves the patient’s life.”92  Inasmuch 
as substantial damage has already been done to the United States Constitution in 
order to fight the war on drugs,93 signs foreshadow a continued erosion of individual 
freedoms justified as an unavoidable side-effect of waging war on the “cancer” of 
illegal drug use.  
Among the rights implicated by compulsory use of pharmacotherapy drugs are 
the rights to bodily integrity, privacy, and freedom of thought, as well as the right to 
provide informed consent before receiving medical treatment.  For prisoners, the 
Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment is also 
implicated.  
A.  Privacy and Liberty Interests Implicated by Involuntary Pharamacotherapy 
In one of his earliest legal opinions, and while still serving as a state court judge, 
Justice Cardozo, sounded a chord that has echoed through many subsequent cases, 
writing in 1914 that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right 
to determine what shall be done with his own body.”94  The Supreme Court has 
routinely recognized that a fundamental aspect of privacy is the “freedom to care for 
one’s health and person, [free] from bodily restraint or compulsion.”95  This principle 
was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in 1990, when in the Cruzan case, 
the Majority noted, “[t]he principle that a competent adult has a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred 
from our prior decisions.”96  Unfortunately, the precise nature and root of this liberty 
interest remains vague.  Professor Winick, for example, notes that “[a]lthough the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions . . . recognize that involuntary medication may 
implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest, they do not explore the nature 
of that interest and leave unresolved many of the substantive and procedural 
                                                                
92SONTAG, supra note 82, at 65.  
93See A Report of The Special Committee on Drugs and the Law of the Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York A Wiser Course: Ending Drug Prohibition (June 14, 1994), 
http://www.drugtext.org/library/reports/nylawyer/nylawyer.htm (“One of the more insidious 
effects of the ‘war on drugs’ has been the gradual erosion of the rule of law and the public’s 
civil liberties.”).  
94Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), overruled in part 
by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). 
95Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
96Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). 
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constitutional questions raised by involuntary treatment.”97  The right to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment appears to be derived from the common law tort of 
battery, combined with liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, including the right to bodily integrity, the right of privacy, 
and a general principle of individual autonomy.98  In practice, these interests have 
been protected by the legal requirements of informed consent. 
Yet, compelling a person to use a pharmacotherapy drug seems to implicate more 
than the bodily integrity rights noted above.  Also at stake is the right to “freedom of 
thought.”  While the phrase “freedom of thought” is not explicitly used in the United 
States Constitution, it has long been recognized as a fundamental right of equal 
stature to the express constitutional guarantees.  As Supreme Court Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo observed, “freedom of thought . . . is the matrix, the indispensable 
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.  With rare aberrations, a pervasive 
recognition of that truth can be traced in our history—political and legal.”99  
Unfortunately, the right to freedom of thought is woefully underdeveloped given 
the capabilities of modern psychopharmacology and continuing advances in the 
neurosciences.  Whatever may be at the roots of human consciousness, there is no 
debate that what, and how, a person thinks is deeply intertwined with his or her 
functional neurochemistry.100  Because pharmacotherapy drugs target brain function, 
                                                                
97BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT, 15 (1st ed. 
1997). 
98See F. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 1.3 LEGAL THEORIES 
OF CONSENT; see also WINICK, supra note 97, at 189, 222 (concluding that the involuntary 
administration of antipsychotic medication, psychosurgery, and electronic stimulation for the 
brain implicate a liberty interest protected by due process,” and are “so serious and long-
lasting that the liberty interest invaded by these treatments should be considered fundamental,” 
requiring heightened judicial scrutiny when sought to be imposed coercively).  
99Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 
395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
100Altering a person’s brain chemistry for the purpose of altering how that person thinks is 
the basis of a pharmaceutical sector with approximately $20 billion in global sales.  The sale 
of Prozac® and similar “antidepressant” drugs is currently one of the most profitable segments 
of the pharmaceutical drug industry.  According to IMS Health, a fifty-year-old company 
specializing in pharmaceutical market intelligence and analyses, “[a]ntidepressants were the 
world’s third-largest therapy class in 2000[.]”  IMS Health, Expanding and Protecting an 
Antidepressant’s Sales, available at http://www.ims-global.com/insight/news_story/0107/ 
news_story_010726a.htm.  Global pharmazceutical sales of antidepressants and mood 
stabilizers was 19.8 billion in 2005.  The same year, Glogal antipsychotic drug sales reached 
16.2 billion.  Ims Health, Leading Therapy Classes by Global Pharmaceutical Sales, 
http://www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/articleC/0,2777,6599_77478579_77479683,00. 
html.  A report published by the Lewin Group in January 2000, found that within the Medicaid 
program alone, “Antidepressant prescriptions totaled 19 million in 1998 . . . [and] 
[a]ntipsychotic prescriptions totaled eleven million in 1998.”  CATHERINE HARRINGTON ET AL., 
THE LEWIN GROUP, ACCESS AND UTILIZATION OF NEW ANTIDEPRESSANT AND ANTIPSYCHOTIC 
MEDICATIONS (2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/search/health/reports/Psychmedaccess/ 
index.htm#TOC (last visited Aug. 20, 2000).  I should underscore that, in my opinion, the 
development of such drugs is to be applauded for their potential to aid millions of suffering 
people who voluntarily use them.   
236 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 19:215 
often blocking entire classes of receptors, they will undoubtedly have some effects 
on how a person thinks.  The pharmacotherapy drug SR141716, for example, 
indiscriminately blocks the brain’s CB1 receptors.  As a result, even the brain’s 
natural endocannabinoids are blocked from entering their home receptors.  These 
endocannabinoids are believed to play a major role in how we feel stress and pain, 
how we sleep, how we modulate food intake, and even how well we remember.101  
For the right to freedom of thought to mean anything, it can no longer exist in a 
Cartesian quarantine, blind to the connection between our thoughts and our brains.  
To avoid eroding freedom of thought from below, it must be found to inherently 
protect the integrity of a person’s underlying functional neurochemistry.102  Coercive 
pharmacotherapy would substantially violate that integrity and thus should be seen as 
infringing the right to freedom of thought.  
B.  Informed Consent 
The principle of informed consent was first articulated in the Nuremburg Code, 
the first sentence of which states: “[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is 
absolutely essential.”103  Today, all fifty states have laws that protect informed 
consent. These laws require that before performing medical experiments, procedures, 
or treatments, medical personnel must make certain disclosures to patients and obtain 
the patient’s consent.104  
                                                                
101Mark Greener, Pharmacy Update: A Gift From the Gods?, in CHEMIST & DRUGGIST 
MODULE 1328 (Feb. 19, 2005), http://www.dotpharmacy.co.uk/up1328.pdf (last visited June 
27, 2005).  
102See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Center for Cognitive Liberty & Ethics in Support of the 
Petition for Certiorari, Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (No. 02-5664), available at 
http://supreme.usatoday.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/02-5664/02-5664.ami.pet.ccle.pdf 
(last visited June 27, 2005) (arguing the merits of cognitive liberty and security and 
elaborating the concepts of “cognitive liberty” and “cognitive security” as necessary 
components of the right to freedom of thought is the project of a longer article by the author 
currently in progress).   
103See Jay Katz et al., Experimentation with Human Beings: The Authority of the 
Investigator, Subject, Professions, and State in Human Experimentation Process, 305-306 
(1972) (containing full text of the Nuremberg Code). 
104JONATHAN P. TOMES, LAWS INFORMED CONSENT: A GUIDE FOR THE HEALTHCARE 
PROFESSIONAL, 69-102 (1993).  California, for example, has an informed consent provision in 
its Penal Code, which in pertinent part states: 
It is hereby recognized and declared that all persons, including all persons 
involuntarily confined, have a fundamental right against enforced interference with 
their thought processes, states of mind, and patterns of mentation through the use of 
organic therapies; that this fundamental right requires that no person with the capacity 
for informed consent who refuses organic therapy shall be compelled to undergo such 
therapy . . . .CAL. PENAL CODE § 2670 (2005).  
Another provision, however, appears to specifically exempt Antabuse, and similar metabolism 
modifiers from the informed consent requirements, stating “[n]othing in this article shall be 
construed to prevent the administration of drugs not connected with a program of conditioning 
and intended to cause negative physical reactions to ingestion of alcohol or drugs.”  CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 2670.5(3)(f) (2005).  
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In general, informed consent requires the satisfaction of two conditions.  First, 
trained medical personnel must tell the patient what alternative treatments exist, the 
benefits and dangers associated with the proposed treatment, and the disadvantages 
of forgoing treatment.  Second, once the person has received all the relevant medical 
information, he or she must freely and voluntarily decide whether or not to undergo 
the treatment.105  Coercion is clearly anathema to informed consent: [i]nformed 
consent means the knowing consent of an individual or his legally authorized 
representative so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice without 
undue inducement or any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other form of 
constraint or coercion.”106  
Coercion, whether “compassionate” or otherwise, is still coercion.  Indeed, 
“compassionate coercion” can be more insidious.  As Justice Brandeis warned 
decades ago: “Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty 
when the government’s purposes are beneficent . . . . The greatest dangers to liberty 
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without 
understanding.”107 
Although it is a criminal offense to use or possess drugs such as marijuana, 
opium, and cocaine for nonmedical purposes,108 a person who desires medical 
treatment for his or her drug use does not forfeit the right to decide whether to utilize 
                                                                
105The American Medical Association’s (AMA) “General Statement on Informed 
Consent,” Code of Medical Ethics, states: 
The patient’s right of self-decision can be effectively exercised only if the patient 
possesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice.  The patient should 
make his or her own determination on treatment.  The physician’s obligation is to 
present the medical facts accurately to the patient or to the individual responsible for 
the patient’s care and to make recommendations for management in accordance with 
good medical practice. The physician has an ethical obligation to help the patient 
make choices from among the therapeutic alternatives consistent with good medical 
practice.  Informed consent is a basic social policy for which exceptions are permitted: 
(1) where the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting and harm 
from failure to treat is imminent; or (2) when risk disclosure poses such a serious 
psychological threat of detriment to the patient as to be medically contraindicated.  
Social policy does not accept the paternalistic view that the physician may remain 
silent because divulgence might prompt the patient to forego needed therapy.  
Rational, informed patients should not be expected to act uniformly, even under 
similar circumstances, in agreeing to or refusing treatment.   
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION: COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMA CODE 
OF MEDICAL ETHICS § E-8.08 (1981), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8488.html 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2005).  
10645 FR 78600.  
107Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
108Depending on the circumstances and the jurisdiction, it is sometimes legal to use these 
drugs for medical purposes.  Eight states currently allow sick people to use marijuana for 
medical purposes, although the federal government is hostile and has indeed prosecuted 
medical users and caregivers in states with medical marijuana protections.  Opium and cocaine 
are both Schedule II substances, which under federal law can be used with a doctor’s 
prescription. 
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drug-based medical treatment.  There is no “drug war exception” to informed 
consent requirements.  
The only exceptions to requirements for informed consent, besides emergencies, 
concern persons who have been declared mentally incompetent, or who are too 
young to make their own medical decisions.  What, exactly, is meant by “mentally 
incompetent” remains vague.  “Although the competency question is…of critical 
importance,” notes Professor Winick in his comprehensive examination of the right 
to refuse mental treatment, “no general agreement exists concerning the appropriate 
legal standard for ascertaining competency to provide informed consent.”109  While 
“Substance Dependence” and “Substance Abuse” are diagnostic categories within 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), a diagnosis 
pursuant to the DSM-IV is insufficient for a de facto legal finding of mental 
incompetence.110  The DSM-IV itself instructs “[I]n most situations, the clinical 
diagnosis of a DSM-IV disorder is not sufficient to establish the existence for legal 
purposes or a ‘mental disorder, ‘mental disability,’ ‘mental disease,’ or ‘mental 
defect.’ In determining whether an individual meets a specified legal standard (e.g., 
for competence…), additional information is usually required beyond that contained 
in the DSM-IV diagnosis.”111  No court has gone so far as to equate the mere use or 
abuse of illegal drugs with mental incompetence.  In only rare circumstances will a 
person’s use, or even addiction to, an illegal drug render that person “mentally 
incompetent” such that he or she should be exempted from informed consent 
requirements.  
Accordingly, for the vast majority of people, including those who use illegal 
drugs, the rights to bodily integrity, privacy, and freedom of thought, along with the 
right of informed consent should stand as a strong and broad barrier to coercive 
pharmacotherapy.  
C.  At Risk Targets for Coercive Pharmacotherapy 
In practical terms, however, some people are more at risk of coercive 
pharmacotherapy than others.  From 1907 to 1978, over 60,000 Americans were 
forcibly sterilized under state sterilization laws.112  These laws targeted criminals, the 
mentally handicapped, people with low IQs, and those suffering from mental illness.  
The enforcement of state and federal drug prohibition laws has been 
disproportionately focused on the poor and on people of color.  As speakers at a 
2002 civil rights conference lamented, “[o]ur criminal laws, while facially neutral, 
are enforced in a manner that is massively and pervasively biased.  The injustices of 
the criminal justice system threaten to render irrelevant fifty years of hard-fought 
                                                                
109WINICK, supra note 97, at 349. 
110In addition to the general dependence and abuse diagnosis defined by the DSM-IV, 
there is also a range of more specific diagnosis based on the particular substance (e.g., alcohol, 
cannabis, cocaine, etc.) involved.  See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994).   
111Id. at xxiii. 
112PHILIP REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES 87 (1991). 
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civil rights progress.”113  Nowhere is this truer than in the drug war.  As noted by 
Human Rights Watch:  
The racially disproportionate nature of the war on drugs is not just 
devastating to black Americans.  It contradicts faith in the principles of 
justice and equal protection of the laws that should be the bedrock of any 
constitutional democracy; it exposes and deepens the racial fault lines that 
continue to weaken the country and belies its promise as a land of equal 
opportunity; and it undermines faith among all races in the fairness and 
efficacy of the criminal justice system.  Urgent action is needed, at both 
the state and federal level, to address this crisis for the American nation.114 
People who have been arrested for drug offenses, who are serving time in prison, 
or who rely on public assistance or other public benefits (including the country’s 59 
million public school children)115 are likely the most vulnerable targets for coercive 
pharmacotherapy.  
1.  Pharmacotherapy and Public Education 
Each year roughly ninety-seven percent of American school children are 
vaccinated against childhood diseases as a precondition to attending school.116  
Almost 100 years ago, the United States Supreme Court ruled that there was nothing 
in the Constitution or elsewhere to prevent a state from mandating compulsory 
vaccination,117 and today nearly every state has laws requiring children to be 
vaccinated prior to entering the public school system.  Parents who refuse to have 
their children vaccinated have been charged with neglect and even child abuse.118  
Many parents would undoubtedly rise in protest to any effort to include 
pharmacotherapy “vaccines” in the childhood vaccine program because drug use is 
not an infectious disease.  Government rhetoric, however, is already laying the 
groundwork for responding to such parental objections.  According to the 2001 
                                                                
113Ronald H. Welch & Carlos T. Angulo, Justice On Trial: Racial Disparities in the 
American Criminal Justice System  (Washington, DC: Leadership Conference on Civil 
Rights/Leadership Conference Education Fund, May 2000), p. v.  
114Human Rights Watch, Punishment and Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the War on 
Drugs, Key Recommendations, http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/drugs/war/ key-reco.htm. 
115United States Census Bureau, School Enrollment – Social and Economic Characteristics 
of Students: October 2003 1 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 2005pubs/p20-
554.pdf (last visited June 27, 2005).   
116Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Vaccination Coverage Among Children 
Enrolled in Head Start Programs and Licensed Child Care Centers and Entering School — 
United States and Selected Reporting Areas, 1999—2000 School Year, 50(39) MORBIDITY 
AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 846, 849 (2001), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5039. 
pdf (last visited June 27, 2005). 
117Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
118See In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606, 607 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992) (petition alleging 
that “the subject child Christine . . . is a neglected child within the meaning of Family Court 
Act . . . in that ‘the respondent [parent] . . . refuses to have Christine immunized in accordance 
with the recommendations of a physician’”). 
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National Drug Control Strategy, drug addiction, like infectious and biological 
diseases that can weaken a person’s immune system or bodily integrity, can also 
provide a fertile ground for other diseases to attack and “place people at increased 
risk for a wide variety of other illnesses.”119  For example, elaborating on how drug 
abuse breeds infectious disease, former “Drug Czar” General McCaffrey writes: 
Drug abuse, whether directly or indirectly, is now a major vector for the 
transmission of infectious diseases, including acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (AIDS), hepatitis B, hepatitis C, and tuberculosis.  Increasing 
numbers of such cases are being reported among the partners of 
intravenous drug users.  Most HIV-infected newborns have mothers who 
acquired this disease through their own drug use or sexual activity with a 
drug user.120  
American schoolchildren are already subject to reduced constitutional 
protections, especially when illegal drugs are concerned.  In 2002, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld drug testing of public school students wishing to participate 
in extracurricular activities on the ground that a public school has an “important 
interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students.”121 
In that case, the Supreme Court stated:  
[t]he need to prevent and deter the substantial harm of childhood drug use 
provides the necessary immediacy for a school testing policy. Indeed, it 
would make little sense to require a school district to wait for a substantial 
portion of its students to begin using drugs before it was allowed to 
institute a drug-testing program designed to deter drug use. 
Given the nationwide epidemic of drug use and the evidence of increased 
drug use in Tecumseh schools, it was entirely reasonable for the School 
District to enact this particular drug testing policy.122  
In the same opinion the Court remarked, “[s]choolchildren are routinely required 
to submit to physical examinations and vaccinations against disease. . . Securing 
order in the school environment sometimes requires that students be subjected to 
greater controls than those appropriate for adults.”123  
On December 1, 2003, NIDA published an official notice seeking grant 
applications focusing on “the identification, evaluation, and development of safe and 
                                                                
119The Office of National Drug Control Policy, supra note 77, at Introductory Pgph. 
120Office of National Drug Control Policy, The 2001 National Drug Control Strategy, Ch. 
1, § 4, The Public-Health Dimension of Substance Abuse, http://www.ncjrs.org/ondcppubs/ 
publications/policy/ndcs01/chap1.html#4 (last visited June 27, 2005).  
121Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2005) 
(“A student who has been convicted of any offense under any Federal or State law involving 
the possession or sale of a controlled substance shall not be eligible to receive any grant, loan, 
or work assistance . . . during the period beginning on the date of such conviction and ending 
after the interval specified . . .”).   
122Earls, 536 U.S. at 836. 
123Id. at 830-31.  
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effective pharmacological treatments for cannabis-related disorders (CRDs).”  A 
section of this notice, titled “Targeting Children,” explained: 
Given the extent of the use of cannabis in the general population and the 
medical and psychological consequences of its use, particularly the 
clinically significant psychosocial impairment, there is a great public 
health need to develop safe and effective therapeutic interventions.  The 
need to develop treatments targeting adolescents and young adults is 
particularly relevant in view of their disproportionate use patterns.124 
On such a landscape, there is at least a reasonable possibility that government 
rhetoric equating the use of illegal drugs with infectious disease, combined with the 
already watered-down constitutional rights of children who attend public school, 
may set the stage for efforts to require children to accept various pharmacotherapy 
“vaccines” as a precondition to attending public school or to participating in sports 
and other extracurricular activities.  
Indeed, in July 2004, the British newspaper The Independent reported: 
A radical scheme to vaccinate children against future drug addiction is 
being considered by ministers . . .  Under the plans, doctors would 
immunize children at risk of becoming smokers or drug users with an 
injection.  The scheme could operate in a similar way to the current 
nationwide measles, mumps and rubella vaccination program.125 
Such plans, should they ever be implemented, would clearly violate the right to 
informed consent if not entirely voluntary.  Despite government rhetoric equating 
drug use with infectious disease and pharmacotherapy drugs with “vaccinations,” the 
analogies fail.  Drug use bears no relationship to infectious diseases like measles, 
mumps, or rubella, and pharmacotherapy is not a “vaccine.”  Further, while the cases 
that have upheld drug testing of public school children have been premised on the 
“important interest in detecting and preventing drug use among its students,”126 and 
on the interest of “prevent[ing] and deter[ing] the substantial harm of childhood drug 
use,”127 interests that could just as easily be offered in support of pharmacotherapy, a 
major distinction exists between drug testing and coercive pharmacotherapy.  
Currently, drug testing is performed on fluids or hair removed from the child’s body 
in a relatively noninvasive manner.  While government examination of a child’s 
bodily fluids or hair raises significant privacy issues (issues which the courts have 
placed secondary to the state’s interest in deterring and preventing illegal drug use by 
school children), those privacy issues pale in comparison to the very direct affront to 
                                                                
124National Institutes of Health, National Institute on Drug Abuse, RFD-DA-04-014, 
Medications Development for Cannabis-Related Disorder (2003), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/ 
guide/rfa-files/RFA-DA-04-014.html (last visited June 29, 2005).  
125Sophie Goodchild & Steve Bloomfield, Children to Get Jabs Against Drug Addiction: 
Ministers Consider Vaccination Scheme.  Heroin, Cocaine and Nicotine Targeted, THE 
INDEPENDENT (UK), July 25, 2004, http://cocaine.org/vaccine/uk.html (last visited June 29, 
2005). 
126Earls, 536 U.S. at 825.   
127Id. at 836. 
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bodily integrity and privacy that would be raised by government requiring a student 
to take a particular pharmacotherapy drug into his or her body and brain.128  
2.  Pharmacotherapy and Public Assistance 
Future recipients of public assistance might conceivably be threatened with 
compulsory pharmacotherapy as a condition to receiving benefits.  Although studies 
indicate that welfare recipients do not use or abuse illegal drugs in any greater 
percentage than working people,129 the stereotype of “drug-using welfare recipients” 
is widespread and has resulted in increased government control and even denial of 
certain benefits. 
Users of illegal drugs, for example, are excluded from the Fair Housing Act.  
Public housing can be denied to any person who has been convicted of a felony drug 
offense or who is known to currently use illegal drugs, even if they are in a drug 
treatment program.130  
Federal law imposes a lifetime bar on any individual convicted of a drug felony 
from receiving food stamps.131  People convicted of drug felonies are also barred 
from voting in many states.  The Washington Post reported in 1997 that 1.46 million 
black men out of a total voting population of 10.4 million have lost their right to vote 
due to felony convictions.132  
In 1996, Congress ended the federal welfare system as an entitlement program.  
Under the new Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, cash assistance for individuals is now limited and can be conditioned on 
meeting job-seeking requirements and adhering to “personal responsibility codes.”133  
One provision of the new Act authorizes states to impose mandatory drug testing as a 
prerequisite to receiving state assistance.134  As a result, Louisiana passed a law in 
                                                                
128While the precise roots and scope of the “liberty” interest remain unarticulated, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he forcible injection of medication into a 
nonconsenting person’s body represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty.”  
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990). 
129According to a federal study, “[t]he percentage of welfare recipients using, abusing, or 
dependent on alcohol or drugs [is] relatively small and consistent with the general US 
population and those not receiving welfare benefits.” B. Grant, & D.  Dawson, Alcohol and 
Drug Use, Abuse, and Dependence among Welfare Recipients, 86 AM. J. HEALTH 1450 
(1996). 
13042 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(s), 1437d(t) (2005); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2005) 
(codifying “one-strike” eviction policies that allow public housing agencies to immediately 
evict tenants on the basis of any criminal drug activity occurring on or off the premises); see 
also Dep’t of Hous. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (upholding a local Public Housing 
Authority’s power to evict an entire family based on the one-strike policy, regardless of any 
prior knowledge on the part of the leaseholder).   
13121 U.S.C. § 862a(a)(2) (2005).  But see 21 U.S.C. § 862a(d)(1)(A) (2005) (allowing 
states to opt out of all or part of the ban.  Twenty-nine states have exercised that right.).   
132P. Thomas, Study Suggests Black Male Prison Rate Impinges on Political Process, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 30, 1997, at A3.   
133See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-02, 604 (2005).   
13421 U.S.C. § 862b (2005).  
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1997 requiring drug testing for welfare recipients and certain public employees.  (A 
task force subsequently decided to limit testing to only those applicants who 
indicated on a questionnaire that they use illegal drugs). In 1998, Florida 
implemented a similar system.  New Jersey, Minnesota, South Carolina and 
Wisconsin also randomly drug test welfare recipients with felony drug convictions.135 
In early 2005, the 109th Congress debated a bill to deny federal welfare funding 
to any state that does not drug test those applying for or receiving welfare benefits.136  
In 1999, Michigan legislators passed a similar law conditioning public assistance on 
passing a random drug test.137  The law was struck down by a federal court which 
ruled that the law’s suspicionless drug testing provisions were an unconstitutional 
infringement on aid recipients’ Fourth Amendment rights.138  
Three basic versions of legislation that might endeavor to connect public aid to 
pharmacotherapy can be anticipated.  In order of increasing concern, these laws are: 
1) offering to reimburse public benefit recipients for the cost of undergoing 
pharmacotherapy; 2) offering a financial incentive (e.g., a “bonus” payment), for 
agreeing to undergo pharmacotherapy; 3) requiring pharmacotherapy as a 
precondition to receiving public aid. 
a.  Reimbursing Voluntary Pharmacotherapy 
Programs reimbursing public assistance recipients for the expense of voluntary 
pharmacotherapy appear to raise few legal concerns.  All fifty states, for example, 
currently have programs reimbursing indigent people for the cost of surgery to 
implant the long-acting contraceptive device Norplant®.139  
Studies have shown that it is good public policy to provide free drug treatment 
for those who seek treatment but cannot afford it.140  If informed and voluntary use of 
                                                                
135Robyn Meredith, Testing Welfare Applicant for Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (late ed.), May 30, 
1999, at A14, http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v99/n575/a04.html?1690 (last visited June 29, 
2005).  
136See The Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2005, H.R. 240, 
109th Cong., available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_ 
cong_bills& docid=f:h240ih.txt.pdf (last visited June 29, 2005).  
137MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.57l (2005). 
138Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (D. Mich. 2000), aff’d en banc, 60 Fed. 
Appx. 601 (6th Cir. 2003).    
139‘Norplant’ is a registered trademark of the Population Council.  It is a long-acting 
implantable contraceptive device for women, approved by the FDA for general use on 
December 10, 1990.  Consisting of six match-sized plastic capsules containing the synthetic 
hormone levonorgestrel, the Norplant capsules are surgically implanted in a woman’s upper 
arm.  Once implanted, the device releases levonorgestrel for as long as five years.  During this 
period, the implanted woman is effectively sterile.  See Drugs.com, Norplant Information 
Page, http://www.drugs.com/MTM/N/Norplant_System.html; see also Dorothy E. Roberts, In 
the Context of Welfare and Reproductive Rights: The Only Good Poor Woman: 
Unconstitutional Conditions and Welfare, 72 DENV. U.L. REV. 931 (1995).  
140See C. PETER RYDELL & SUSAN S. EVERINGHAM, CONTROLLING COCAINE: SUPPLY 
VERSUS DEMAND PROGRAMS xvi (1994), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/ 
MR/MR331/ (last visited June 29, 2005) (“Domestic enforcement costs 4 times as much as 
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pharmacotherapy will aid in the treatment process, no reason exists to exclude it 
from reimbursement.  Public funds for voluntary pharmacotherapy ought to be 
available to subsidize that treatment, especially when the government is 
enthusiastically willing to spend thousands of dollars to arrest and imprison that 
same person for using a controlled substance.  
Unfortunately, federal funds are predominantly allocated to policing and 
enforcing criminal drug prohibition, rather than to funding treatment on demand. In 
2002, for example, less than twenty percent of the federal drug control policy budget 
was allocated to funding treatment programs.141  
Nothing is coercive about reimbursing an indigent person for the costs of medical 
treatment.  More worrisome is that people living in poverty typically have reduced 
access to professional medical advice concerning elective procedures.  As a result, 
they may find it difficult to obtain general information about the potential health 
risks associated with a particular pharmacotherapy drug, as well as specific 
information regarding their own health concerns vis-à-vis such a drug.  Indeed, some 
of the pharmacotherapy drugs are so new that data concerning their long-term side 
effects has yet to be collected or analyzed.  Without sufficient access to medical 
information and advice, consent to undergo pharmacotherapy, while perhaps 
voluntary, would not be informed, and hence would not satisfy the requirements of 
informed consent. 
b. Financial Incentive to Undergo Pharmacotherapy 
Another foreseeable form of future legislation might offer a financial incentive or 
“bonus” for agreeing to undergo pharmacotherapy.  In this scenario, the pubic aid 
recipient would receive the standard aid payment regardless of whether he or she 
underwent pharmacotherapy, but would also receive an additional bonus payment if 
he or she agreed to undergo pharmacotherapy.  
Less than a year after the Norplant contraception device was approved, a Kansas 
legislator introduced a bill that would have paid welfare mothers $500 if they would 
consent to using Norplant, and an additional $50 for each year that they remained on 
the contraceptive.142  After the bill failed, its author proposed a second bill that would 
have made the insertion of Norplant a condition of probation for women convicted of 
certain drug possession offenses.143  That bill also did not pass. Representative David 
Duke of Louisiana (an admitted former leader in the Ku Klux Klan who ran for 
President of the United States in 1992) unsuccessfully introduced a similar bill in 
1991, which would have paid welfare mothers $100 per month if they agreed to 
                                                           
treatment for a given amount of user reduction, 7 times as much for consumption reduction, 
and 15 times as much for societal cost reduction.”).   
141Office of National Drug Control Policy, The 2003 National Drug Control Strategy: 
Budget Highlights, Budget Summary 6, Table 2 (2002). 
142H.R. 2089, 74th Leg., 2d Sess. (Kan. 1991) (defeated).   
143H.R. 2255, 74th Leg., 2d Sess. (Kan. 1991) (died in committee); see Stephanie 
Denmark, Birth-Control Tyranny, N.Y. TIMES, October 19, 1991, at A23; see also Kerry 
Patrick, Poor Women and Society Benefit by Linking Norplant, Welfare Aid, WICHITA EAGLE, 
(Wichita, Kansas) March 4, 1991, at 11A.   
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Norplant.144  All told, at least thirteen states have considered bills that would link 
state welfare payments to the use of Norplant.145 
Legislation proposing “bonus” payments for low-income people who agree to 
undergo pharmacotherapy would likely meet the same unsuccessful political end as 
efforts to provide bonuses for using Norplant.  Assuming, however, that such 
legislation was successfully enacted in the future, it would raise difficult informed 
consent issues.  
In order to obtain the added financial “bonus” some low-income people, even 
those who do not use or desire to use illegal drugs, might be tempted to undergo 
pharmacotherapy.  The desire to rise above poverty is a powerful drive, and could 
lead some people to undergo pharmacotherapy even if it was contraindicated or 
potentially risky given other pre-existing health concerns.  Courts would have to 
decide whether such economic “coercion” is sufficient to vitiate “voluntary” consent.  
Being poor in a capitalist system is to be inherently disempowered within that 
system, causing economic decisions to take on what some might argue are shades of 
coercion.  Even if this is not legally sufficient to constitute coercion, it raises the 
moral issue of whether government ought to intentionally exploit such economic 
disadvantages.  Further, as discussed in the preceding section, low-income people 
have reduced access to medical information concerning the purposes, risks, and 
effects of pharmacotherapy, raising questions that the person’s consent to undergo 
pharmacotherapy in order to receive a “bonus” payment might be based on 
insufficient information to satisfy the requirements of informed consent. 
c.  Conditioning Public Benefits on Pharmacotherapy 
The most inherently coercive type of foreseeable legislation linking 
pharmacotherapy with public aid would be the direct conditioning of public 
assistance on the use of a pharmacotherapy drug.  Under this potential legislative 
scheme, only those who agree to undergo pharmacotherapy would be eligible for 
public aid.  
Though none of the bills have passed, legislators in several states have sought to 
condition public assistance on the use of Norplant.  A bill proposed in Mississippi 
sought to mandate the use of Norplant for female welfare recipients, requiring 
“women with four or more children to be implanted with Norplant in order to qualify 
for or continue to be eligible for public assistance.”146  A similar bill was introduced 
but failed to pass in Florida. 
While less coercive than being physically forced to undergo pharmacotherapy, a 
parent who is dependant upon receiving government assistance in order to pay rent 
or buy food for his or her children would undoubtedly feel powerless to refuse 
pharmacotherapy if it meant forfeiting necessary financial assistance.  Such a scheme 
                                                                
144H.R. 1584, 17th Reg. Sess. (La. 1991); Maralee Schwartz, Duke Presses Louisiana 
Birth Control, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 29, 1992, at A14.  
145See Gwendolyn Mink, The Day, Berry & Howard Visiting Scholar: Welfare Reform in 
Historical Perspective, 26 CONN. L. REV. 879 (1994). 
146S. 2895, (Miss. 1992) (defeated); See David S. Coale, Norplant Bonuses and the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 71 TEX. L. REV. 189, 195 (1992); see also ALAN 
GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, NORPLANT: OPPORTUNITIES AND PERILS FOR LOW-INCOME WOMEN 
(SPEC. REP. 1) (Dec. 1992).   
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would be overtly and intentionally premised on economic coercion and would thus 
weigh heavily against a finding that “consent” to undergo pharmacotherapy was truly 
voluntary.  Combined with very limited and sometimes non-existent access to 
professional medical advice, such a legislative scheme would prey upon the poor and 
encourage the antithesis of informed consent.  
In addition, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
government must satisfy the strict scrutiny test in order to allocate public benefits by 
conditioning that allocation on the waiver of a fundamental right.  Thus, if directly 
imposing pharmacotherapy on a person is found to substantially infringe on the 
combined rights to privacy, bodily integrity, and freedom of thought, conditioning 
public assistance on waiving those rights would be unconstitutional unless the 
government can show that the pharmacotherapy condition serves a compelling state 
interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.147  This is known as the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine.  
Assuming the government’s interest is to reduce or deter the use of illegal drugs 
by those on public assistance, forced pharmacotherapy is a grossly overbroad means 
of advancing that interest.  As already noted, most people who receive public 
assistance do not use illegal drugs, and never will.  Accordingly, demanding that 
they all undergo pharmacotherapy in order to receive public assistance would be the 
antithesis of a “narrowly tailored” means of advancing the government’s interest in 
enforcing drug prohibition.  Even for those aid recipients who are found to use illegal 
drugs, coercing them to take pharmacotherapy drugs as a precondition to receiving 
aid is overbroad.  The vast majority of drug treatment programs, both in-patient and 
out-patient, operate with only talk therapy, counseling, encouragement, and 
monitoring. Therefore, imposing pharmacotherapy even on those aid recipients who 
are found to use illegal drugs is, not the least restrictive means of reducing or 
deterring their use of drugs. 
3.  Pharmacotherapy and the Criminal Justice System 
Today, of the two million prisoners in the United States (roughly one in every 
140 U.S. residents) approximately one quarter are serving time for drug 
convictions.148  The United States Supreme Court has held that “convicted prisoners 
do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and 
confinement in prison.”149  The unique security issues in prison, however, have also 
led the Court to recognize that the same standard directed to the alleged 
constitutional violations of nonprisoners does not apply to prisoners.  “When a prison 
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”150  This reduced standard, 
combined with the fact that “rehabilitation” is one of the traditional purposes of the 
                                                                
147Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); see Charles R. Bogle, Unconscionable 
Conditions: A Contractual Analysis of Conditions on Public Assistance Benefits, 94 COLUM. 
L. REV. 193 (1994). 
148Page M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, PhD, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2002, 
Tables 15 & 18, BJS Bull. No. NCJ 200248 (July 2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ 
pdf/p02.pdf. 
149Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). 
150Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
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criminal justice system, invites the conclusion that pharmacotherapy medicines, 
which are characterized as “treating” drug addiction, could potentially find their way 
into prisoners’ blood streams without their consent.  
As discussed earlier, the 2002 National Drug Control Strategy report coined the 
term “compassionate coercion” and promoted it as a key element for success in the 
battle against users of illegal drugs.  The White House press release announcing the 
report explained that in addition to pressure from family, friends, employers, and the 
community, “[c]ompassionate coercion also uses the criminal justice system to get 
people into treatment.”151 
In the near future, a person sentenced to prison for a drug offense might 
conceivably be forced to take a pharmacotherapy drug as part of his or her 
“rehabilitation.”  Further, given that illegal drugs can reportedly be found in just 
about every prison in America and because prisoners are politically weak and 
generally regarded unsympathetically by the general populace, one can even imagine 
prison officials moving to mandate pharmacotherapy drugs for all inmates as a 
means of maintaining prison security and safety.  
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that “central to all other 
corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the 
corrections facilities themselves.”152  Further, because judges are removed from the 
day-to-day challenges and realities that commonly face prison officials and because 
operation of correctional facilities is “the province of the Legislative and Executive 
Branches of our Government, not the Judicial,” prison administrators are accorded 
“wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that 
in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain 
institutional security.”153 
Prison officials might argue rationally that mandatory pharmacotherapy for all 
prisoners is a means of increasing the safety of both prisoners and prison workers. 
Pharmacotherapy within prisons would presumably alter the ratio of benefit to risk 
for those prisoners able to obtain an illegal drug inside prison.  Some prisoners 
forced to take pharmacotherapy would presumably find that the benefits of using an 
illegal drug with attenuated effects is outweighed by the risk of being caught with an 
illegal drug and having his or her sentence increased.  This might lead to a reduced 
demand for drugs within prison and to a corresponding reduction in supply.  
                                                                
151Press Release, The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, The President’s 
National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2002/02/20020212-2.html.  
152Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1978). 
153Bell, 441 U.S. at 547. 
248 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 19:215 
a.  Informed Consent 
i.  Prisoners 
Unless a court has determined that a prisoner is mentally incompetent, the 
informed consent requirements discussed earlier retain their validity within the 
prison context.154   
While no court, let alone the United States Supreme Court, has ruled on the 
circumstances in which a prisoner can be forced to undergo pharmacotherapy for 
illegal drug use, the Supreme Court has placed strict limits on when prison officials 
can force a prisoner to take psychiatric medication.155  
A prisoner can be compelled to take psychiatric medication in only two 
circumstances.  First, if he suffers from a serious mental illness and that illness 
renders him mentally incompetent to make his own medical decisions, then prison 
medical authorities are permitted to forcibly treat the prisoner, so long as the 
treatment is in the best interests of the prisoner and complies with due process.156  
Second, a prisoner whose mental illness leads him or her to engage in dangerous 
behavior that threatens to harm other prisoners or prison staff may be forcibly treated 
with psychiatric medication.157  
As discussed earlier, no court has ever found that the use of illegal drugs alone 
constitutes “mental incompetence.”  Indeed, no court has found that physical 
addiction to a drug, by itself, constitutes “mental incompetence.”  Thus, forced 
treatment with pharmacotherapy merely because a prisoner used or is addicted to, an 
illegal drug would not satisfy the existing tests for when prisoners can be forced to 
undergo psychiatric treatment.  Likewise, even if a psychiatrist found that a 
                                                                
154Under Maryland law, a prisoner who is found to be addicted to drugs may be placed on 
a supervised methadone treatment plan, but treatment cannot begin without the prisoner’s 
written informed consent.  MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 9-603 (2004). 
155Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980) (“A criminal conviction and sentence of 
imprisonment extinguish an individual’s right to freedom from confinement for the term of his 
sentence, but they do not authorize the State to . . . subject him to involuntary psychiatric 
treatment without affording him additional due process protections.”); Rogers v. Okin, 634 
F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1980) (“[A] person has a constitutionally protected interest in being left 
free by the state to decide for himself whether to submit to the serious and potentially harmful 
medical treatment . . . as part of the penumbral right to privacy, bodily integrity, or personal 
security.”); Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1974) (performing a 
hemorrhoidectomy without the prisoner’s consent implicated the prisoner’s right to refuse 
medical treatment); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992) (‘“The forcible injection of 
medication into a nonconsenting person’s body . . . represents a substantial interference with 
that person’s liberty.’ In the case of antipsychotic drugs . . . that interference is particularly 
severe . . .”) (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990)).  
156See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 182 (2003) (“Every State provides avenues 
through which, for example, a doctor or institution can seek appointment of a guardian with 
the power to make a decision authorizing medication — when in the best interests of a patient 
who lacks the mental competence to make such a decision.”).  
157Washington v. Harper 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990). Federal regulations set forth specific 
procedures that must be followed before prisoners can be forced against their will to take a 
psychotropic medicine.  See 28 C.F.R. 549.43.   
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prisoner’s illegal drug use or addiction constituted a “substance abuse disorder” 
within the DSM-IV, this finding alone does not constitute mental incompetence.158  
Therefore, forcing a prisoner to undergo pharmacotherapy would not be justified 
unless that prisoner’s drug use was producing a mental illness that led him or her to 
pose a danger to others within the prison.  These rules instruct that in all but 
extraordinary circumstances, and only after findings that comply with due process, 
prison authorities would be acting unlawfully if they were to compel a prisoner to 
take a pharmacotherapy drug against his or her will.  Unless a prisoner is dangerous 
to others or is determined to be mentally incompetent, he or she has a right to refuse 
pharmacotherapy drugs and a right to give informed consent before receiving them. 
ii.  Parolees and Probationers 
In addition to the roughly two million Americans currently serving time behind 
bars, an additional 4.8 million Americans are on parole or probation.159  The 
overwhelming majority of people charged with violating federal or state drug 
prohibition laws are placed on probation, rather than incarcerated.160  The United 
States Supreme Court has held that the purpose of probation in criminal cases is to 
provide a period of grace in order to aid the rehabilitation of an offender.161  Most 
states have laws that require sentencing courts to impose various conditions on 
probationers conditions that must be satisfied in order to successfully complete 
probation and thereby avoid spending time in custody. So long as they are 
reasonably related to rehabilitation and are not blatantly unconstitutional, relatively 
few limitations exist on a trial judge’s discretion to impose particular probation 
conditions.  As one law professor noted:  
Courts have quite accurately described the scope of the sentencing court’s 
discretion as “breathtaking,” and commentators have observed that any 
legislative limitations on that discretion are “conspicuously absent.”  One 
recent media account suggested that the content of special conditions “is 
limited only by the sentencing judge’s imagination.”162  
                                                                
158“[M]ental illness or disability is insufficient in itself to constitute incompetence.” (PAUL 
S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHIEL, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 220 
(2d ed. 1991).  
159Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole Statistics: Summary Findings, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pandp.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2004); Bureau of Justice 
Statistics , Prison Statistics: Summary Findings, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
prisons.htm (last modified Apr. 24, 2005); see also Bureau of Justice Statistics , Corrections 
Statistics: Summary Findings, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/correct.htm (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2005) (“In 2003, 6.9 million people were on probation, in jail or prison, or on 
parole at yearend 2003 -- 3.2% of all U.S. adult residents or 1 in every 32 adults.”).  
160Lauren E. Glaze & Seri Palla, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Probation and Parole in the 
United States, 2003, BJS Bull. No. NCJ 205336 (July 2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs 
/pub/pdf/ppus03.pdf. 
161Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).  
162Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some Proposals 
for Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 75 (2000) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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People granted probation in drug cases are routinely required to waive their 
Fourth Amendment rights by agreeing to be searched at any time, submit to regular 
and sometimes random drug testing, and successfully complete a drug treatment 
program.163  Considered in light of the federal government’s acknowledgment that 
“compassionate coercion also uses the criminal justice system to get people into 
treatment,” some future court will almost assuredly attempt to impose 
pharmacotherapy as a condition of granting probation to a defendant in a drug case. 
There is precedent. 
In 1992, the FDA approved a long-acting contraceptive device containing 
synthetic progestin medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) hormones.  Manufactured 
by Pfizer, Inc., it is sold under the trade name Depo-Provera®.  It is typically 
injected into a woman’s buttocks or upper arm and renders her temporarily sterile for 
up to three months.164  
Researchers discovered that MPA also had effects on men.  When injected into a 
man, MPA accelerates the metabolism of testosterone while also suppressing its 
production.  The result is a reduction of up to seventy-five percent in the amount of 
testosterone in the man’s body, thus “lowering the intensity of inappropriate sexual 
cravings and the frequency of unacceptable erotic preoccupations.”165  Its use in men 
is not without side effects, some of which include: 
increased appetite, weight gain of fifteen to twenty pounds, fatigue, 
mental depression, hyperglycemia, impotence, abnormal sperm, lowered 
ejaculatory volume, insomnia, nightmares, dyspnea (difficulty in 
breathing), hot and cold flashes, loss of body hair, nausea, leg cramps, 
irregular gall bladder function, diverticulitis, aggravation of migraine, 
hypogonadism, elevation of the blood pressure, hypertension, phlebitis, 
                                                                
163See SAMHSA, Office of Applied Studies, The Dasis Report: How Men and Women 
Enter Substance Abuse Treatment (Sep. 2001), http://www.drugabusestatistics.samhsa.gov/2k 
1/enterTX/enterTX.htm (“For men, the most frequent source of referral to drug treatment is 
through the criminal justice system.  [In 1998], [s]ome 39 percent of men, compared to 25 
percent of women, entered treatment as the result of a judicial process . . . . Sixty-two percent 
of adult men entering treatment for marijuana abuse were sent by the criminal justice system . 
. . .”).  
164American Academy of Family Physicians, Depo-Provera: An Injectable Contraceptive, 
available at http://www.familydoctor.org/handouts/043.html (last visited July 5, 2005).  
165Fred S. Berlin, The Paraphilias and Depo-Provera: Some Medical, Ethical and Legal 
Considerations, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 233, 235 (1989); see also Berlin & 
Meinecke, Treatment of Sex Offenders With Antiandrogenic Medication: Conceptualization, 
Review of Treatment Modalities, and Preliminary Findings, 138(5) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 604 
(1981); see also Letter From Public Citizen Health Research Group to Connecticut Depo-
Provera Task Force (Oct. 17, 1983), at p. 8 (The Connecticut Department of Correction 
appointed a study group to consider the use of the drug for male sex offenders in 1983, but the 
committee rejected the proposal primarily because of the committee’s “very real concerns 
about the safety of this drug.”); see also Pierre Gagne, Treatment of Sex Offenders With 
Medroxyprogesterone Acetate, 138(5) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 644 (1981) (stressing that MPA 
therapy treatment be undertaken only with the patient’s informed consent and that it be 
accompanied by counseling); see also People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310, 315-316 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1984). 
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diabetic sequelae, thrombosis (leading to heart attack), and shrinkage of 
the prostate and seminal vessels.166 
While for some men suffering from an unhealthy obsession with sex, voluntary 
use of MPA could prove helpful, but use of MPA quickly expanded beyond 
voluntary use.  California, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, and Oregon 
have all passed chemical castration statutes.167  While these statutes vary, most 
provide a legislative authorization for court-imposed MPA injections as a probation 
condition for certain sexual offenses.168  Similarly, while Norplant is considered very 
reliable and many women use it voluntarily, use of Norplant did not remain 
exclusively voluntary for long.  Less than one month after Norplant received FDA 
approval, a California court offered a woman a choice between serving a seven-year 
sentence for child abuse or serving only one year and having Norplant implanted 
while on probation.  The woman “chose” Norplant.169  Others have also.170 
                                                                
166Larry Helm Spalding, Florida’s 1997 Chemical Castration Law: A Return to the Dark 
Ages, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 117, 125 (1998) (citations omitted).  
167CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (2005) (permitting MPA treatment for parolees who have 
committed specified sex offense); FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (2005) (providing for administration 
of MPA treatment to persons convicted of sexual battery, but medical expert must first find 
that the defendant is an appropriate candidate for treatments and the court order must specify 
duration of treatment); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-44.2 (2004) (giving the Board of Pardons 
discretionary authority to administer MPA treatment coupled with mandatory counseling as a 
condition of parole for child molesters); IOWA CODE § 903B.1 (2004) (providing that persons 
convicted of certain first time sex offenses may undergo hormonal intervention therapy as a 
condition of release); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:538 (2005) (allowing for the use of MPA as 
part of a voluntary treatment plan that convicted sex offenders has to undertake if they are to 
receive probation or parole); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-512 (2004) (providing for MPA 
treatment of sex offenders); OR. REV. STAT. § 144.625 (2003) (establishing pilot MPA 
treatment program for certain sex offenders).  In addition, in 1996 and 1997, chemical 
castration bills were introduced in Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Tennessee.  Larry Helm Spalding, 
Florida’s 1997 Chemical Castration Law: A Return to the Dark Ages, 25 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 
117, 139 n.14 (1998).   
168In 1984, a Michigan judge conditioned a man’s grant of probation in a sexual 
misconduct case on the man’s use of Depo-Provera.  People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310, 
311 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).  The man appealed, arguing that the condition was 
“unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment, a violation of fundamental rights of liberty, 
privacy, bodily integrity, equal protection, and procedural and substantive due process.”  Id. at 
314.  The Michigan Appellate Court reversed the Depo-Provera condition, but did so without 
reaching the constitutional issues.  Rather, the appellate court held that use of MPA in males 
for the purpose of decreasing sex drive “fails as a lawful condition of probation because it has 
not gained acceptance in the medical community as a safe and reliable medical procedure.”  
Id. at 316.  The appellate court also raised concerns about informed consent, noting that both 
prisoners and mentally incompetent persons “enjoy a greater degree of protection from 
extraordinary medical procedures.”  Id.  
169People v. Johnson (Cal. Super. Ct., Tulare County 1991) (No. 29390).  The woman’s 
“attorney, who had not been at the probation hearing, asked the court to set aside the terms of 
the probation in view of [the woman’s] medical unsuitability for Norplant treatment, her 
constitutional right to privacy, and the statutory argument that Norplant was unrelated to her 
rehabilitation.”  Melissa E. Fraser, Note, Gender Inequality in In Vitro Fertilization: 
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Further, while no reliable information has been found on its prevalence today, 
some courts have conditioned a grant of probation for alcohol-related offenses on the 
probationer using Antabuse.  In the late 1970s, the federal government funded pilot 
programs testing the use of Antabuse as a probation condition in some drunk-driving 
and public intoxication cases.  A total of thirteen county court systems received 
funding under the “Demonstration Programs in Antabuse.”171  A law review analysis 
of the pilot program found that it was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, cruel 
and unusual punishment, and failed to comply with the requirements for informed 
consent.172  The article concluded that “[b]ecause Antabuse’s effects are highly 
invasive, and because the judicial context of such programs is inherently coercive, 
courts should not employ the drug at all. Instead they should adopt rehabilitation 
schemes . . . that attempt to re-educate alcohol offenders without the use of drugs.”173 
As noted earlier, informed consent requires, at a bare minimum, adequate 
information about the possible risks and benefits of a given medical treatment, as 
well as an environment free of coercion.  A criminal courtroom is an unlikely venue 
for satisfying either requirement for informed consent.  Few judges, prosecutors, 
probation officers, or defense attorneys have the medical knowledge, training, or 
time necessary to make the required advisements to the defendant for each particular 
pharmacotherapy drug, let alone to assess the defendant’s own unique healthcare and 
treatment issues.  Thus, a defendant who is offered probation on the condition that he 
or she undergo pharmacotherapy will likely be placed in the position of having to 
make a medical treatment decision without the appropriate information, thereby 
vitiating informed consent.  Further, being forced to choose between incarceration 
and “medical treatment” with a pharmacotherapy drug is inherently coercive.174  
There are very few things that people will avoid more than going to jail or prison.  
Any alternative to loss of physical freedom, separation from family and friends, and 
loss of employment and income, will have an undeniably attractive appearance.  It is 
hard to see how such an inherently coercive situation—one that essentially forces a 
                                                           
Controlling Women’s Reproductive Autonomy, 2 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 183, 207 (1998) (citations 
omitted).  The Judge refused to reconsider the condition, and on appeal, the merits of the 
condition were not discussed because the woman was found to have violated her probation by 
using drugs.  Id. Thus, the Norplant condition was moot on appeal.  Id.  See Birth Curb Order 
Is Declared Moot, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1992, at A23; see also Matthew Rees, Shot in the 
Arm: The Use and Abuse of Norplant. Involuntary Contraception and Public Policy, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC (Washington D.C.), Dec. 9, 1991, at 16.   
170In the aforementioned law review note, Melissa Fraser documented three other women 
who agreed to use Norplant as part of plea agreements.  Fraser, supra note 169, at 207.   
171T. J. Springer, Program Level Evaluation of ASAP Diagnosis, Referral and 
Rehabilitation Efforts, in VOL. I – DESCRIPTION OF ASAP DIAGNOSIS, REFERRAL AND 
REHABILITATION FUNCTIONS (Sept. 1976); Corey H. Marco & Joni Michel Marco, Antabuse 
Medication in Exchange for a Limited Freedom – Is it Legal?, in 5(4) AM. J.L. & MED.  295, 
296 n.10 (Winter 1980). 
172Marco & Marco, supra note 171 at 297-98. 
173Id. at 330. 
174See People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310, 316-17 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that 
Depo-Provera probation condition was not compatible with requirements of informed 
consent). 
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person to barter his or her natural neuro- and biochemistry in exchange for 
freedom—is compatible with the requirements of voluntary and informed consent. 
b.  Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishment,” and many 
state constitutions provide independent protections.175  Every citizen of the United 
States, whether free, incarcerated, on parole, or on probation, is protected by the 
Eighth Amendment.  
However, because the Eighth Amendment’s protection only pertains to 
“punishment,” future advocates for compulsory pharmacotherapy within the criminal 
justice system will likely aim to characterize pharmacotherapy as “rehabilitative” or 
“treatment-oriented” in nature, in an effort to distinguish it from “punishment.”176  
Although the term “pharmacotherapy” linguistically implies that the drugs provide 
“therapy” or treatment, it would clearly be superficial to conclude on that basis alone 
that they are not subject to analysis under the Eighth Amendment.  Neither the 
industry moniker “pharmacotherapy” nor a future legislative statute as authorizing 
“therapy” or “treatment” via use of such drugs is conclusive in determining whether 
a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights have been implicated.177 
The therapeutic value of pharmacotherapy as a coercive “treatment” for illegal 
drug use has yet to be determined, let alone accepted within the medical community.  
Additionally, while voluntary and informed use of pharmacotherapy by prisoners 
may well prove therapeutic and rehabilitative, imposing it against a prisoner’s will 
may actually be counterproductive.  Forced pharmacotherapy precludes a prisoner 
from utilizing nondrug methods for coming to physical and psychological terms with 
the roots of his or her use of illegal drugs.  The effect is to deny the prisoner the 
opportunity to build the self-will and self-confidence necessary for sustainable 
rehabilitation and to resist problem drug use beyond the prison walls and without the 
pharmacotherapy drug.  This is true even if the pharmacotherapy is combined with 
traditional counseling or talk-therapy.   
Pharmacotherapy is also not without side effects.  Indeed, it is possible that 
ancillary and adverse side-effects alone may render some coercive pharmacotherapy 
on prisoners, parolees, or probations “cruel and unusual.”178  Most of the 
pharmacotherapy drugs are so new that it has yet to be determined whether they will 
                                                                
175The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”  U.S. Const. amend. VIII.  Many 
state constitutions also provide independent protections against cruel and unusual punishment. 
176See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (discussing how only “punishment” is limited 
by the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment).  
177Id. at 95 (“[E]ven a clear legislative classification of a statute as ‘nonpenal’ would not 
alter the fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute.”); Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 
1139-40 (8th Cir. 1973) (noting that “the mere characterization of an act as ‘treatment’ does 
not insulate it from eighth amendment scrutiny,” and that “neither the label which a State 
places on its own conduct, nor even the legitimacy of its motivation, can avoid the 
applicability of the Federal Constitution”). 
178Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 455 (D. Ind. 1972), aff’d, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 
1974) (holding it is cruel and unusual punishment to inject juveniles in a correctional institute 
with tranquilizing drugs that can have significant side effects). 
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produce long-term side effects or even what health risks may arise after several 
weeks, months, or years of use.  Inasmuch as many of the pharmacotherapy drugs 
work by targeting parts of the brain, and others work by systemically altering a 
person’s metabolism, the health risks associated with their use are potentially 
significant.  Compelling a prisoner to use pharmacotherapy drugs would force that 
person to risk suffering side effects or other serious adverse reactions from the drug.  
These side effects will vary from pharmacotherapy to pharmacotherapy, and in some 
cases may rise to the level that might be considered psychological and/or 
physiological cruelty. 
In June 2004, for example, researchers published a case study of a woman who 
developed multiple sclerosis following obesity treatment with a CB1 receptor 
antagonist.179  In 2003, Roxane Laboratories, Inc., discontinued sale and distribution 
of the opioid agonist ORLAAM, as a result of “increasing reports of severe cardiac-
related adverse events.”  Given that CB1 receptors are ten times more abundant in 
the brain than opioid receptors, the possibilities for adverse events from blocking 
CB1 are clearly substantial, and as yet undetermined. 
Some pharmacotherapy drugs will undoubtedly receive FDA approval, but for 
uses other than treating illegal drug use.  For example, Sanofi-Sythelabo has sought 
FDA approval for a version of SR141716 that will be marketed under the name 
“Acomplia” as an aid for overcoming obesity, overeating, or smoking.180  
Compelling a prisoner to use a drug like SR141716 for “off label”181 
pharmacotherapy purposes could arguably constitute experimental use, raising 
obvious concerns about the law and ethics of using prisoners as human guinea 
pigs.182  
Here again, the difference between voluntary and informed use by prisoners and 
use compelled or coerced by the courts or legislature is critically significant.  There 
is an unfortunate worldwide history of prisoner-abuse, including within the United 
States.183  In the 1920, United States prisoners were routinely labeled as genetically 
                                                                
179B.W. Van Oosten et al., Multiple Sclerosis Following Treatment with a Cannabinoid 
Receptor-1 Antagonist, in 10:3 MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS 330-31 (2004).  
180Matt Apuzzo, Associated Press, Quit Smoking with a Pill?  Researchers Say New Drugs 
Show Promise, March 8, 2005; Kolata, Will a New Drug Melt the Pounds?  It May, but 
Doctors Urge Caution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, at A25. 
181Because the FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, physicians may lawfully 
prescribe a medication for uses beyond the scope of the FDA’s approved indication(s).  Drug 
companies, however, may only advertise a drug for FDA-approved indications.  See In 
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001) (observing that “off-
label” use is “an accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate in this area 
without directly interfering with the practice of medicine.”). 
182See Beck, James M. and Elizabeth D. Azari, 1998. FDA, Off-Label Drug Use, and 
Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions. 53 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 71 
(arguing that “off-label” use of a drug does not constitute experimental use if primarily 
employed to benefit the patient).  
183For discussions concerning informed consent and medical experimentation on prison 
populations, see Vernon H. Mark & Robert Neville, Brain Surgery in Aggressive Epileptics: 
Social and Ethical Implications, in 226:7 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 765 (eds. Robert Hunt & John 
Arras, 1977); ROBERT M. VEATCH, CASE STUDIES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 267-71(1977); Barbara 
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unfit and then forcibly sterilized.  Believing that such sterilization improved society, 
approximately 60,000 incarcerated or mentally handicapped people were sterilized in 
the United States between 1907 and the mid-1970s.184  The American eugenics 
movement reached its zenith in 1927 with the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Buck v. Bell, wherein the Court upheld the sterilization of mentally 
challenged women as both constitutional and good for society.185  The highest court 
of Maryland recently deplored this unfortunate chapter of American jurisprudence:  
“[O]ur own use of prisoners, the institutionalized retarded, and the 
mentally ill to test malaria treatments during World War II was generally 
hailed as positive, making the war ‘everyone’s war.’  Likewise, in the late 
1940’s and early 1950’s, the testing of new polio vaccines on 
institutionalized mentally retarded children as considered appropriate.  
Utilitarianism was the ethic of the day.”186  
The history of homosexuality and the law is also instructive.  Until 1973, 
“homosexuality” was listed as a psychiatric disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders.  Up until June 2003, when the United States Supreme 
Court declared them unconstitutional, thirteen states had laws making it a criminal 
offense to engage in consensual homosexual sex. 187  In some of these states, people 
who admitted that they were homosexual or who were “accused” of being gay or 
lesbian were subject to involuntary confinement under mental health laws and 
subjected to “reparative therapy” designed to forcibly convert them into 
heterosexuals.188  “Treatment,” in addition to counseling, included penile 
                                                           
L. Bernier, Class, Race, And Poverty: Medical Technologies And Socio-Political Choices, 11 
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 115 (1994). 
184Paul Lombardo, Eugenic Sterilization Laws, http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/ 
eugenics/essay8text.html (last visited July 12, 2005). 
185Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“It is better for all the world, if instead of 
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1942 did the United States Supreme Court hold that it was unconstitutional to permanently 
sterilize people convicted of criminal offenses.  Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 U.S. 535 (1942).  
Despite the Skinner decision, a handful of states continue to have laws allowing for the 
compulsory sterilization of criminals or the mentally incompetent.  See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. 
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186Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 836 (Md. 2001) (citations 
omitted). 
187See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
188See, e.g., James Garland, The Low Road to Violence: Governmental Discrimination as 
a Catalyst for Pandemic Hate Crime, 10 L. & SEX. 1, 75-76, 75 nn.355 & 357 (2001); George 
Chauncey, The Postwar Sex Crime Panic, in TRUE STORIES FROM THE AMERICAN PAST 160 
(William Graebner ed., McGraw-Hill 1993); Estelle B. Freedman, Uncontrolled Desires: The 
Response to the Sexual Psychopath, 1920-1960, in 74 J. AM. HIST. 83 (1987); an Alabama law 
“reform” commission announced that gay people are “persons with abnormal tendencies” who 
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plethysmograph (PPG) shocks (electronic shock triggered by penile erection) and 
forced drugging.  Some state laws even permitted the forcible sterilization of 
homosexuals.189  Drug use, like homosexuality, has a ubiquitous presence throughout 
history and across cultures.190  Like homosexuality, drug use and drug prohibition are 
subjects of contention and controversy.  The discussion of these topics is often 
influenced by ignorance, fear and avoidance, conflicting moral and religious dogmas, 
and contrasting political aims.  History has a way of showing that the forced 
“treatments” of today, may tomorrow be seen as cruel, unusual, and even barbaric 
punishment.  
Although there are several interpretive camps constellated around the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause, as punishment, it is hard to conclude that coercive 
pharmacotherapy is anything other than cruel and unusual.191  
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than 
the dignity of man.  While the State has the power to punish, the 
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits 
of civilized standards.  Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be 
imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any technique 
outside of the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally 
suspect.192 
There are few images more chilling to civilized standards than government 
agent’s force-injecting a mentally competent nondangerous prisoner with brain-
changing drugs.  Blocking a person’s brain receptors with a pharmacotherapy drug 
because their crime was filling those receptors with an illegal drug, harkens back to 
archaic Biblical notions of retributive punishment such as “eye for an eye, tooth for a 
tooth” and forward to a “neuron for a neuron.”  Using a drug to block specific 
receptors in a prisoner’s brain is like injecting a thief with a drug that paralyzes his 
or her hands, or like injecting a Peeping Tom with a chemical that causes cataracts.  
It is overbroad and akin to torture or barbarism.  Brain receptors, like eyes and teeth, 
have far more “legal uses” than those that are forbidden.  All these uses would be 
disrupted or denied by imposing on prisoners the crippling chemical effects of 
coercive pharmacotherapy.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
While the state has long had the power to restrain a person’s body (e.g. 
handcuffing arms and legs or imprisonment), the compelled use of pharmacotherapy 
would open chilling new dimensions in the power relationship between citizens and 
their government.  Compulsory use of pharmacotherapy would signal a striking 
expansion of the state’s policing mechanisms on at least two new fronts.  First, from 
external policing to internal policing, and second, from restraining a person’s 
physical body and behavior to directly restraining a person’s brain function and 
thought processes.  Such a dramatic extension of government power would be 
unprecedented. 
In Stanley v. Georgia,193 the United States Supreme Court struck down a Georgia 
law that banned the private possession of obscene material.  “Our whole 
constitutional heritage,” explained the Court, “rebels at the thought of giving 
government the power to control men’s minds.”194  Justice Harlan, concurring in 
United States v. Reidel, characterized the constitutional right protected in Stanley as 
“the First Amendment right of the individual to be free from governmental programs 
of thought control, however such programs might be justified in terms of permissible 
state objectives.”195  
If “[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of given government 
the power to control men’s minds,” as made clear by the United States Supreme 
Court, then our whole constitutional heritage must likewise rebel at the thought of 
giving government the power to compel a person to use a pharmacotherapy drug – a 
drug designed and intended to lockdown certain receptor sites in the brain.  
Inasmuch as one’s thoughts and thought processes are the very core of one’s 
individuality and the root of both freedom and responsibility, permitting the state to 
forcibly pierce a person’s body to insert a pharmacotherapy drug that is designed to 
patrol or police that person’s body for the purpose of controlling possible brain 
states, grants the state the ultimate power over the individual’s body and mind.  Such 
an action should be seen as implicating the interests in bodily integrity, privacy, and 
freedom of thought - a combined interest in the person that ought to require the very 
highest imaginable justification to breach.  A lesser standard is incompatible with a 
democracy built upon the premise of individual freedom and limited government.  
Sixty years ago the United States Supreme Court opined, “[f]reedom to think is 
absolute of its own nature; the most tyrannical government is powerless to control 
the inward workings of the mind.”196 This is no longer the case.  Pharmacotherapy 
drugs give the government that power.  Tyranny over the mind is no longer beyond 
the reach of the government.  The question for the future is whether the government, 
in its naïve quest for a drug-free world, can resist that tyrannical power. 
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